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LIBERAL	  RESPONSIBILITIES	  
	  Robin	  West	  *	  
COREY	   BRETTSCHNEIDER,	   WHEN	   THE	   STATE	   SPEAKS,	   WHAT	   SHOULD	   IT	   SAY?:	   HOW	  DEMOCRACIES	  CAN	  PROTECT	  EXPRESSION	  AND	  PROMOTE	  EQUALITY	  	  (2012).	   Pp.	   232.	   Hard-­‐cover	  $35.00.	  	   JAMES	  E.	   FLEMING	  &	  LINDA	  C.	  MCCLAIN,	  ORDERED	  LIBERTY:	  RIGHTS,	  RESPONSIBILITIES,	  AND	  VIRTUES	  (2013).	  Pp.	  384.	  Hardcover	  $49.95.	  	   Corey	  Brettschneider’s	  book,	  When	  the	  State	  Speaks,	  What	  Should	  it	  Say?:	  How	  
Democracies	  Can	  Protect	  Expression	  and	  Promote	  Equality,1	  and	  James	  Fleming	  and	  Linda	  McClain’s	  Ordered	   Liberty:	   Rights,	   Responsibilities	   and	  Virtues2	   share	   a	   good	  deal	  of	  common	  ground.	  Both	  books	  aim	  to	  defend	  or	  rehabilitate	  constitutional	  lib-­‐eralism,	   and	   liberal	   constitutional	   rights	   in	  particular,	   against	   communitarian	  and	  left	  wing	  critics.	  	  Both	  seek	  to	  do	  so	  by	  focusing	  on	  various	  responsibilities	  implied	  or	   suggested	   by	   liberal	   rights,	   but	   which	   have	   also	   been	   somewhat	   obscured	   by	  them.	  They	  both	  see	  the	  liberal	  rights	  tradition	  as	  intrinsically	  worthy	  and	  as	  capa-­‐ble	  of	  justly	  mediating	  the	  relations	  between	  citizens	  and	  states,	  but	  they	  also	  both	  argue	   for	  a	  midway	  correction,	   in	   the	  direction	  of	  a	  deeper	  appreciation	  of	  and	  to	  some	  degree	   a	  wider	   role	   for	   the	   responsibilities	   required	   by	   liberalism	  of	   states	  and	  citizens.	  Professor	  Brettschneider’s	   focus	   is	   on	   the	   liberal	   and	  distinctively	  American	  constitutional	  right,	  which	  he	  generally	  endorses,	  to	  engage	  in	  hate	  speech,	  and	  he	  accordingly	  defends	   the	   right	  against	  various	  critics,	   such	  as	   Jeremy	  Waldron	  and	  Charles	   Lawrence,	   who	   criticize	   this	   right	   for	   undermining	   equality.3	   But	  Brettschneider	  has	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  sympathy	  for	  the	  criticism,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  his	  de-­‐fense	  of	  robust	  First	  Amendment	  protections	  for	  hate	  speech	  moves	  a	  long	  way	  to	  meet	   it.	   What	   is	   missing	   from	   more	   traditional	   liberal	   defenses	   of	   a	   broad	   First	  Amendment	   right	   to	   engage	   in	   hateful	   speech,	   Brettschneider	   argues,	   is	   an	  
                                                            	   *	   Frederick	  J.	  Haas	  Professor	  of	  Law	  and	  Philosophy,	  Georgetown	  Law.	  	  	   1.	  	   COREY	   BRETTSCHNEIDER,	   WHEN	   THE	   STATE	   SPEAKS,	   WHAT	   SHOULD	   IT	   SAY?:	   HOW	   DEMOCRACIES	   CAN	  PROTECT	  EXPRESSION	  AND	  PROMOTE	  EQUALITY	  (2012).	  	   2.	  	   JAMES	   E.	   FLEMING	   &	   LINDA	   C.	   MCCLAIN,	   ORDERED	   LIBERTY:	   RIGHTS,	   RESPONSIBILITIES,	   AND	   VIRTUES	  (2013).	  	   3.	  	   JEREMY	  WALDRON,	  THE	  HARM	  IN	  HATE	  SPEECH	  (2012);	  Charles	  R.	  Lawrence	  III,	  If	  He	  Hollers	  Let	  Him	  
Go:	  Regulating	  Racist	   Speech	  on	  Campus,	   1990	  DUKE	  L.J.	   431	   (1990).	  See	  also	   CATHARINE	  A.	  MACKINNON,	  ONLY	  WORDS	   (1996);	  Mari	  Matsuda,	  Public	  Response	   to	  Racist	  Speech:	  Considering	   the	  Victim’s	  Story,	  87	  MICH.	  L.	  REV.	  2320	  (1989).	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acknowledgement	   of	   the	   responsibility	   of	   the	   liberal	   state	   to	   also	   promote	   the	  equality	   that	   speech	   tends	   to	  undermine,	   and	   to	  do	   so	  by	  explicitly	   criticizing	   the	  content	  of	  the	  hateful	  speech	  that	  it	  so	  vigilantly	  protects.4	  First	  Amendment	  rights	  to	  speech	  cannot	  be	  faulted	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  they	  insulate	  spheres	  within	  which	  hate	  groups	  prosper,	  so	  long	  as	  the	  state	  that	  protects	  those	  rights	  also	  counters	  the	  hate	  speech	  they	  generate	  with	  persuasive	  speech	  of	  its	  own,	  which	  both	  reaffirms	  the	   state’s	   commitment	   to	   the	   equality	   and	   dignity	   of	   all	   of	   us,	   and	   explains	   the	  ways	  in	  which	  protection	  of	  even	  noxious	  and	  harmful	  speech	  furthers	  those	  com-­‐mitments.	  In	  a	  parallel	  fashion,	  Fleming	  and	  McClain	  articulate	  and	  then	  defend	  a	  general	  conception	  of	  “constitutional	  liberalism”	  and	  its	  core	  individual	  rights	  against	  vari-­‐ous	  critics,	  including	  communitarians	  such	  as	  Mary	  Ann	  Glendon5	  and	  Michael	  San-­‐del,6	  and	  “minimalists”	  such	  as	  Cass	  Sunstein7	  and	  Jeremy	  Waldron,8	  who	  argue	  that	  for	  various	  reasons	  those	  individual	  rights	  have	  undermined	  either	  civic	  society	  or	  democratic	  processes	  or	  both.	  But	   they	  too	  have	  some	  sympathy	   for	   the	  criticism,	  and	   their	   defense	   is	   likewise	   quite	   different	   from	   the	   traditional.	  Unlike	  most	   de-­‐fenders	  of	  liberal	  constitutionalism,	  they	  insist	  that	  constitutional	  liberalism	  should	  be	  explicitly	  committed	  to	  promoting	  the	  responsibility	  of	  citizens	   for	   formulating	  their	  own	  conception	  of	   the	  good	  and	   their	  own	   theories	  of	   justice,	  which	   in	   turn	  will	   jointly	   contribute	   to	   responsible	   democratic	   and	   personal	   self-­‐government.9	  Constitutional	   liberalism	  does	  not	  undermine	   civic	   responsibilities,	   but	   it	   can	   and	  should	  make	  the	  grounds	  of	   its	  support	  of	  them	  far	  more	  explicit.	  Accordingly,	   for	  Fleming	   and	  McClain,	   various	   substantive	  due	  process	   rights,	   such	   as	   the	   right	   to	  abortion,10	  the	  right	  to	  marry	  and	  to	  sexual	  expression,11	  and	  to	  educate	  one’s	  chil-­‐dren,12	  cannot	  be	  faulted	  for	  creating	  virtue-­‐free	  zones	  of	  reckless	  license,	  so	  long	  as	  it	  is	  understood,	  as	  the	  Court	  has	  sometimes—but	  fitfully—tried	  to	  do	  in	  the	  dozens	  of	  cases	   it	  canvases;	   that	   those	  rights	  are	   justified,	   largely	  or	   in	  part,	  by	   their	   ten-­‐dency	  not	  only	  to	  protect	  liberty,	  but	  also	  to	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  development	  of	  responsible	  citizens.	  These	  citizens,	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  rights,	  are	  more	  capable	  of	  oc-­‐cupying	   a	   space	   in	   the	  political	   order	   in	   an	   informed	  and	   responsible	  way	   and	  of	  formulating	  and	  following	  through	  on	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  that	  will	  guide	  their	  own	  life	  paths.	  So,	   both	  Brettschneider,	   on	   the	  First	  Amendment,	   and	  Fleming	  and	  McClain,	  on	  (loosely)	  the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment,	  respond	  to	  critiques	  of	  those	  rights	  by	  in-­‐voking	  some	  essential	  connection	  between	  the	  realm	  of	  rights	  and	  the	  realm	  of	  re-­‐sponsibilities:	  for	  Brettschneider,	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  state	  to	  speak,	  when	  fun-­‐
                                                            	   4.	  	   BRETTSCHNEIDER,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  3–4.	  	   5.	   See	  MARY	  ANN	  GLENDON,	  RIGHTS	  TALK:	  THE	  IMPOVERISHMENT	  OF	  POLITICAL	  DISCOURSE	  (1991).	  	   6.	   See	  MICHAEL	  J.	  SANDEL,	  LIBERALISM	  AND	  THE	  LIMITS	  OF	  JUSTICE	  (1982).	  	   7.	  	   CASS	   R.	   SUNSTEIN,	   RADICALS	   IN	   ROBES:	   WHY	   EXTREME	   RIGHT-­‐WING	   COURTS	   ARE	  WRONG	   FOR	   AMERICA	  (2005).	  	   8.	  	   Jeremy	  Waldron,	  The	  Core	  of	  the	  Case	  Against	  Judicial	  Review,	  115	  YALE	  L.J.	  1346	  (2006).	  	   9.	  	   FLEMING	  &	  MCCLAIN,	  supra,	  note	  2	  at	  2,	  115.	  	  	   10.	  	   See	  generally	  id.	  	   11.	   Id.	  at	  178-­‐206.	  	   12.	   Id.	  at	  139-­‐45.	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damentally	   liberal	   values	   are	   undermined	   by	   hateful	   speech	   that	   the	   liberal	   state	  itself	  must	  protect,	  and	  for	  Fleming	  and	  McClain,	  the	  responsibility	  of	  individuals	  to	  formulate	  theories	  of	  the	  good	  and	  of	  justice	  to	  guide	  their	  public	  and	  private	  deci-­‐sions	  and	  that,	  they	  argue,	  is	  in	  fact	  furthered,	  rather	  than	  undercut,	  by	  robust	  indi-­‐vidual	  due	  process,	  privacy,	  and	  liberty	  rights.	  Both	  books	  accordingly	  advance	  our	  appreciation	  of	   the	  capacity	   for	  nuance	  and	   flexibility	   in	   liberal	  understandings	  of	  rights,	  and	  both,	  taken	  jointly,	  may	  signify	  an	  important	  shift	  in	  liberal	  thinking	  re-­‐garding	  rights:	  all	  three	  authors	  urge	  a	  heightened	  focus	  on	  responsibility,	  not	  as	  a	  critique	  of	  liberal	  rights,	  but	  rather,	  as	  an	  essential	  feature	  of	  them.	  Rights	  generally,	  and	  the	  abortion	  right	  in	  particular	  per	  Fleming	  and	  McClain,	  do	  not	  undercut	  per-­‐sonal	  responsibility,	  contra	  the	  claims	  of	  communitarian	  critics,	  nor	  do	  free	  speech	  rights,	  per	  Brettschneider,	  necessarily	  undermine	  equality,	  as	  argued	  by	  egalitarian	  critics	  of	   the	  overly	  broad	  First	  Amendment	  protection	  of	  hate	   speech,	   so	   long	  as	  the	  state	  tends	  to	  its	  responsibility	  to	  respond	  to	  it.	  Both	  books	  thus	  aim	  to	  defend	  a	  version	  of	  liberalism	  and	  constitutional	  protection	  of	  liberal	  values,	  and	  both	  would	  seek	  to	  amend	  liberalism	  by	  demanding	  a	  greater	  attention	  to,	  or	  at	  least	  a	  greater	  articulation	   of	   the	   responsibilities	   of	   either	   states	   or	   citizens	   implied	   by	   the	   very	  qualities	  of	  liberalism	  that	  have	  captured	  the	  attention	  of	  its	  critics.13	  We	  should	  at-­‐tend	  to	  the	  responsibilities	  implied	  by	  the	  zones	  of	  insularity	  generated	  by	  individ-­‐ual	  rights,	  according	  to	  Fleming	  and	  McClain,	  and	  to	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  state	  to	  criticize	  the	  speech	  facilitated	  by	  the	  rights	  it	  protects,	  so	  as	  to	  bolster	  the	  equality	  that	  hate	  speech	  seeks	  to	  undermine,	  according	  to	  Brettschneider.	  This	  shared	  ground―both	  books	  defend	   liberal	  constitutional	  rights	  by	  high-­‐lighting	   the	   responsibilities	   they	   entail―goes	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   some	   common	  strengths	   but	   also	   some	   common	   limitations.	   Let	   me	   start	   with	   their	   shared	  strengths.	  Both	  books	  are	  refreshingly	  feminist:	  Fleming	  and	  McClain	  quite	  explicit-­‐ly,	  and	  Brettschneider	  more	  implicitly,	  but	  nevertheless	  strongly.14	  Both	  recognize	  and	  even	  centralize	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  private	  sphere	  for	  either	  the	  equality	  or	  subordination	  of	  women	  and	  girls,	  and	  both	  accordingly	  grapple	  with	  the	  Constitu-­‐tion’s,	   and	   the	   liberal	   rights	   tradition’s,	   problematic	   valorization	   of	   that	   sphere.	  Fleming	   and	  McClain	  do	   so	  by	   seeking	   to	   better	   support	   various	   rights,	   primarily	  reproductive	   rights,	   that	   are	  necessary	   to	  women’s	   equality,15	   and	  Brettschneider	  does	  so	  by	  recognizing	  the	  relevance	  of	  familial	  beliefs	  and	  child	  raising	  practices	  to	  the	  equal	  democratic	  position	  and	  participation	  of	  women	  and	  girls.16	  Both	  grapple	  with	  problems	  of	  either	  constitutionalism	  and	  rights	  or	  rights-­‐lessness	  that	  argua-­‐bly	  damage	  women’s	  prospects	  for	  equality	  and	  good	  lives.	  Both	  attend	  to	  problems	  of	  our	  very	  private	  as	  well	  as	  our	  public	  lives	  that	  often	  lie	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  constitu-­‐tionalism:	   the	  quality	  of	  our	  public	  education	  and	   the	   threat	   to	   it	  posed	  by	  home-­‐schooling	  movements,17	   the	   tension	  between	   the	  privacy	  we	  not	   only	   cherish	   but	  
                                                            	   13.	  	   See	  generally	  BRETTSCHNEIDER,	  supra	  note	  1;	  FLEMING	  &	  MCCLAIN,	  supra	  note	  2.	  	   14.	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  BRETTSCHNEIDER,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  11,	  32,	  36–37,	  53–54;	  FLEMING	  &	  MCCLAIN,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  51-­‐80,	  98-­‐117.	  	   15.	  	   See	  generally	  FLEMING	  &	  MCCLAIN,	  supra	  note	  2.	  	   16.	  	   BRETTSCHNEIDER,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  53–54.	  	   17.	  	   FLEMING	  &	  MCCLAIN,	  supra	  note	  2	  at	  140-­‐45.	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need	  to	  envision	  and	  then	  create	  good	  lives	  for	  ourselves,	  and	  the	  community	  and	  state	  support	  we	  need	  to	  sustain	  those	  good	  lives	  but	  which	  can	  threaten	  that	  pri-­‐vacy,	  the	  quality	  of	  our	  private	  relationships	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  those	  relation-­‐ships―including	  marriage―to	  our	  status	  as	  free	  and	  equal	  citizens	  with	  dignity	  and	  recognition	  by	   the	   state,18	   the	   importance	  of	  our	   faith	  and	   religious	  beliefs	   to	  our	  communities	  and	  selves,	  but	  with	  a	  clear-­‐eyed	  recognition	  of	   the	  challenges	   those	  faiths	   and	   those	   beliefs	   can	   pose	   to	   our	   national	   and	   civic	   quest	   for	   equality	   and	  dignity	   for	   all	   citizens.19	   Both	   books	   seek	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   Constitution’s	  role	  in	  mediating	  these	  tensions,	  and	  in	  helping	  us	  collectively	  lean	  forward	  toward	  a	  just	  state,	  without	  sacrificing	  our	  private	  and	  intimate	  lives,	  rightly	  insulated	  from	  the	  pressures	  of	  state	  mandates	  and	  communitarian	  pressures	  to	  conform,	  and	  both	  are	  attuned	   to	   the	  very	  real	  possibilities	   that	   the	  Constitution	  and	   the	  Court	  most	  responsible	  for	  its	  interpretation	  might	  get	  it	  very	  wrong,	  threatening	  our	  privacy,	  our	  intimate	  lives,	  and	  our	  equality	  and	  dignity	  all.20	  The	  books	  jointly	  portend,	  we	  should	   hope,	   a	   turn	   in	   constitutional	   theory	   toward	   a	   frank	   recognition	   of	   these	  problems,	  a	   sensitivity	   to	  and	  awareness	  of	   the	  problematic	  nature	  of	   the	  privacy	  and	  speech	  we	  so	  highly	  value,	  and	  a	  willingness	  and	  desire	  to	  understand	  the	   in-­‐tersection	  of	  constitutional	  law	  and	  aspirations	  with	  our	  very	  ordinary,	  private,	  fa-­‐milial	  lives,	  as	  well	  as	  with	  more	  public	  problems	  of	  statecraft.	  All	  of	  this	  collectively	  is	   a	   hugely	   welcome	   change	   in	   the	   tone	   as	   well	   as	   content	   of	   our	   constitutional	  scholarship	  regarding	  the	  First	  and	  Fourteenth	  Amendments’	  protections	  of	  liberty	  and	  privacy.	  Now	   for	   the	   shared	   limitation,	   which,	   I	   am	   afraid,	   might	   compromise	   the	  books’	  interest,	  at	  least	  for	  many	  contemporary	  constitutional	  theorists.	  The	  limita-­‐tion	  (if	  it	  is	  that)	  is	  simply	  that	  both	  books	  are	  “traditional”	  works	  of	  liberal	  consti-­‐tutional	   theory;	   there	   is	   not	   a	   hint	   of	   postmodernism	   or	   for	   that	   matter	   post-­‐anything.	   There	   is	   no	   critical	   deconstruction,	   no	   discussion	   of	   neo-­‐or	   post-­‐Lochnerian	  libertarianism,	  and	  only	  occasional	  mentions	  of	  popular,	  progressive,	  or	  skeptical	  constitutionalism.	  Both	  books	  deal	  with	  constitutional	  problems	  and	  par-­‐adoxes	   that	   emerged	   from	   the	   case	   law	   and	   debates	   from	   two	   or	   three	   decades	  back,	  and	  generally	  with	  the	  tools	  of	  analysis	  and	  critique	  from	  that	  period	  as	  well.	  This	  in	  itself	  is	  hardly	  a	  fault,	  and	  contributes	  in	  some	  ways	  to	  the	  books’	  strengths:	  their	  targets	  and	  their	  analysis,	  partly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  authors’	  decisions	  to	  eschew	  some	   of	   these	   trends,	   are	   crystal	   clear.	   But	   their	   traditionalism	   also	   limits	   their	  reach,	  and	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  both	  books	  have	  a	  (somewhat)	  dated	  choice	  of	  both	  subject	  matter	  and	  interlocutors.	   The	   various	   constitutional	   questions,	   conundrums,	   and	   paradoxes	  that	  McClain,	  Fleming	  and	  Brettschneider	  address	  all	  have	  their	  genesis	  in	  debates	  from	  the	  1970s,	  1980s,	  and	  1990s	  when	  liberal	  constitutional	  theory	  generally,	  and	  individual	   rights	   in	  particular,	  were	  under	  more	   sustained	   attack	   from	  both	   com-­‐munitarian	  critics,	  who	  worried	  about	  the	  excessive	  individualism	  of	  our	  rights	  tra-­‐
                                                            	   18.	  	   BRETTSCHNEIDER,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  51-­‐64;	  FLEMING	  &	  MCCLAIN,	  supra	  note	  2	  at	  98-­‐100.	  	   19.	  	   BRETTSCHNEIDER,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  52;	  FLEMING	  &	  MCCLAIN,	  supra,	  note	  2	  at	  129-­‐39.	  	   20.	  	   See	  generally	  BRETTSCHNEIDER,	  supra	  note	  1;	  FLEMING	  &	  MCCLAIN,	  supra	  note	  2.	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dition,21	  and	  from	  the	  left	  wing	  critical	   legal	  studies	  and	  critical	  race	  theory	  move-­‐ments,22	   who	   worried	   about	   its	   tensions	   with	   egalitarianism,	   than	   is	   true	   today.	  This	  is	  of	  course	  not	  entirely	  the	  case.	  Jeremy	  Waldron	  has	  emerged	  as	  a	  prominent	  rights	  critic	  just	  in	  the	  last	  decade,23	  and	  emerging	  rights,	  such	  as	  the	  right	  to	  bear	  arms	   and	   the	   right	   to	  marriage,	   have	   sustained	   the	   attention	   of	  more	   than	   just	   a	  handful	   of	   prominent	   constitutional	   theorists,	   including	  plenty	  who	   are	   critical	   of	  one	  or	   the	  other	  or	  both	  of	   these	  newly	  discovered	   rights.24	  Nevertheless,	   for	   the	  most	  part,	  the	  attacks	  on	  the	  First	  Amendment	  as	  overbroad	  because	  it	  is	  overpro-­‐tective	  of	  hate	  speech,	  and	  on	  reproductive	  rights	  as	  undermining	  of	  civic	  virtue	  and	  individual	  responsibility,	  were	  far	  more	  center	  stage	  twenty	  to	  thirty	  years	  ago	  than	  they	  are	  today.	  Those	  rights,	  while	  still	  vitally	  important	  and	  if	  anything	  even	  more	  politically	   volatile	   now	   than	   they	  were	   then,	   nevertheless,	  were	  widely	   viewed	   in	  those	  decades	  as	  posing	  the	  central	  questions	  of	  eighties’	  and	  nineties’	  constitution-­‐al	  scholarship:	   the	  dubious	  and	  “penumbral”	  origins	  of	   the	  abortion	  right,	  and	  the	  hidden	  costs,	  the	  zones	  of	  moral	  insularity	  and	  the	  political	  subordination	  of	  some	  groups	  by	  others	  that	  First	  Amendment	  rights	  arguably	  create,	  all	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  privacy	  and	  liberty.25	  In	  part,	  but	  only	  in	  part,	  the	  problem	  is	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  the	  particular	  indi-­‐vidual	   rights	   the	   three	   authors	   have	   chosen	   to	   study:	   Fleming	   and	  McClain	   focus	  heavily	  on	  the	  rights	  of	  individuals	  to	  procure	  abortions	  (among	  a	  number	  of	  other	  rights,	   including	   prominently	   the	   much	   newer	   right	   to	   same	   sex	   marriage)	   and	  Brettschneider,	  on	  the	  right	  to	  engage	  in	  hate	  speech	  and	  critics	  of	  those	  rights.	  By	  contrast,	   a	   number	   of	   our	   most	   prominent	   contemporary	   liberal	   and	   libertarian	  constitutional	  scholars	  who	  are	  squarely	  in	  the	  individual	  rights	  tradition	  have	  tak-­‐en	   up	   a	   quite	   different	   generation	   of	   rights,	   many	   echoing	   Lochnerian	   or	   neo-­‐Lochnerian	   themes,	   including	   the	   rights	   of	   the	   terminally	   ill	   to	   die,26	   the	   rights	   of	  
                                                            	   21.	  	   GLENDON,	  supra	  note	  5;	  SANDEL,	  supra	  note	  6.	  	   22.	  	   Mark	  Tushnet,	  Corporations	  and	  Free	  Speech,	   in	  THE	  POLITICS	  OF	  LAW:	  A	  PROGRESSIVE	  CRITIQUE	  253	  (David	   Kairys	   ed.,	   1982);	   Lawrence,	   supra	   note	   3;	  Matsuda,	   supra	   note	   3;	  Mark	   Tushnet,	  An	   Essay	   on	  
Rights,	  62	  Tex.	  L.	  Rev.	  1363	  (1984).	  	   23.	  	   WALDRON,	  supra	  note	  3.	  	   24.	  	   For	  commentary	  on	  gun	  rights,	  see	  Randy	  E.	  Barnett	  &	  Don	  B.	  Kates,	  Under	  Fire:	  The	  New	  Consen-­‐
sus	  on	  the	  Second	  Amendment,	  45	  EMORY	  L.J.	  1139	  (1996);	  Sanford	  Levinson,	  Arms	  and	  Constitutional	  De-­‐
sign:	  An	  Essay	  for	  Laurence	  Tribe,	  42	  TULSA	  L.	  REV.	  883	  (2007);	  Cass	  R.	  Sunstein,	  Second	  Amendment	  Min-­‐
imalism:	  Heller	   as	   Griswold,	   122	   HARV.	   L.	   REV.	   246	   (2008).	   For	   commentary	   on	   marriage	   rights,	   see	  William	  N.	  Eskridge,	  Jr.,	  A	  History	  of	  Same-­‐Sex	  Marriage,	  79	  VA.	  L.	  REV.	  1419	  (1993);	  Reva	  B.	  Siegel,	  Con-­‐
stitutional	  Culture,	  Social	  Movement	  Conflict	  and	  Constitutional	  Change:	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  De	  Facto	  Era,	  94	  CAL.	  L.	  REV.	  1323	  (2006);	  Nelson	  Tebbe	  &	  Deborah	  A.	  Widiss,	  Equal	  Access	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Marry,	  158	  U.	  PA.	  L.	  REV.	  1375	  (2010).	  	   25.	  	   On	   abortion,	   see,	   e.g.,	   ROBERT	   H.	   BORK,	   SLOUCHING	   TOWARDS	   GOMORRAH:	   MODERN	   LIBERALISM	   AND	  AMERICAN	  DECLINE	  (1996);	  GLENDON,	  supra	  note	  5;	  Catharine	  MacKinnon,	  Privacy	  v.	  Equality:	  Beyond	  Roe	  v.	  Wade,	  in	  FEMINISM	  UNMODIFIED:	  DISCOURSES	  ON	  LIFE	  AND	  LAW	  93	  (1987);	  John	  Hart	  Ely,	  The	  Wages	  of	  Cry-­‐
ing	  Wolf:	  A	  Comment	  on	  Roe	  v.	  Wade,	  82	  YALE	  L.J.	  920	  (1973);	  Ruth	  Bader	  Ginsburg,	  Some	  Thoughts	  on	  
Autonomy	  and	  Equality	  in	  Relation	  to	  Roe	  v.	  Wade,	  63	  N.C.	  L.	  Rev.	  375	  (1985);	  Catharine	  A.	  MacKinnon,	  
Reflections	  on	  Sex	  Equality	  Under	  Law,	  100	  YALE	  L.J.	  1281	  (1991);	  Tushnet,	  supra	  note	  22.	  On	  hate	  speech	  and	   the	  First	  Amendment,	   see	  Charles	  R.	   Lawrence	   III,	  Forbidden	  Conversations:	  On	  Race,	   Privacy,	   and	  
Community	   (A	   Continuing	   Conversation	   with	   John	   Ely	   on	   Racism	   and	   Democracy),	   114	   YALE	   L.J.	   1353	  (2005);	   Lawrence,	   supra	   note	  3;	   Catharine	  A.	  MacKinnon,	  Pornography	  As	  Defamation	  and	  Discrimina-­‐
tion,	  71	  B.U.	  L.	  REV.	  793	  (1991);	  Matsuda,	  supra	  note	  3;	  Tushnet,	  supra,	  note	  22.	  	  	   26.	  	   See	   Ronald	  Dworkin	   et	   al.,	  Assisted	   Suicide:	   The	  Philosophers’	   Brief,	  N.Y.	  REV.	   OF	  BOOKS	   (Mar.	   27,	  1997).	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parents	  to	  homeschool,27	  the	  rights	  of	  sick	  people	  to	  use	  medical	  marijuana,28	  vari-­‐ous	   rejuvenated	   rights	   to	   the	   unimpeded	   enjoyment	   of	   property,29	   and	   of	   course,	  newly	  minted	  Second	  Amendment	  rights	  to	  own	  and	  use	  guns.30	  This	  turn	  to	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  rights	  has	  in	  turn	  generated	  new	  paradigms	  of	  rights	  (or	  new	  wine	  in	  old	  Lochnerian	  bottles)	  as	  well	  as	  plenty	  of	  critical	  commentary.31	  But,	  with	  the	  ex-­‐ception	  of	  McClain	  and	  Fleming’s	   treatment	  of	  homeschooling,	   there	   is	   little	   if	  any	  attention	   given	   over	   in	   these	   books	   to	   this	   neo-­‐Lochnerian	   and	   libertarian	   rights	  revival,	  or	  to	  the	  critical	  attention	  it	  has	  received.	  Even	  within	  the	  domain	  created	  by	   the	   individual	   rights	   most	   directly	   addressed	   in	   these	   books―rights	   to	   hate	  speech,	   to	   procure	   birth	   control	   and	   abortions,	   and	   rights	   to	   same-­‐sex	   mar-­‐riage―the	   arguments	   are	   a	   bit	   backward	   looking.	   Today,	   worries	   over	   the	   over-­‐breadth	  of	  our	  First	  Amendment	  rights	  of	  individuals	  to	  speech	  have	  been	  to	  some	  degree	   eclipsed	   by	  worries	   about	   overbroad	   First	   Amendment	   rights	   of	   corpora-­‐tions	  to	   finance	  and	  control	  elections	   in	  the	  name	  of	   free	  speech,32	   just	  as	  worries	  over	   individual	  rights	  to	  abortion	  or	  birth	  control	  have	  given	  way	  to	  worries	  over	  the	  religious	  or	  expressive	  rights	  of	  institutions,	  such	  as	  church-­‐related	  or	  identified	  hospitals	  and	  universities,	  to	  withhold	  coverage	  for	  such	  services.33	  Institutions,	  as-­‐sociations,	   and	   corporations	   have	   in	   effect	   trumped	   individuals	   as	   the	   holders	   of	  rights	  we	  care	  about	  or	  despair.	  But	  the	  mismatch	  between	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  these	  books	  and	  current	  con-­‐troversies	  goes	  a	  bit	  deeper	  than	  the	  question	  of	  “which	  rights.”	  Debates	  over	  indi-­‐vidual	   rights	  generally—their	   legitimacy,	   their	  origins,	  and	   their	   fidelity	   to	   text	  or	  history,	  whether	  or	  not	   they	   “conflict”	  with	  each	  other,	  when	   liberty	   and	  equality	  collide,	   as	   per	   Brettschneider’s	   concerns,	   and	  whether	   or	   not	   they	   plant	   seeds	   of	  virtue	  or	  seeds	  of	  vice,	  as	  per	  Fleming	  and	  McClain’s—in	  fact,	  have	  ceded	  ground	  in	  our	   canon	   of	   constitutional	   dilemmas,	   to	   worries	   regarding	   an	   utterly	   paralyzed	  first	   branch	   of	   government	   and	   an	   overly	   aggressive	   executive	   branch,	   leading	   a	  number	  of	  scholars	  to	  doubt	  the	  wisdom	  not	  just	  of	  this	  or	  that	  constitutional	  doc-­‐trine,	   but	   of	   the	  Constitution	   itself,	   and	  perhaps	   constitutionalism	  as	  well.	   Should	  the	  Constitution,	  with	  its	  various	  anti-­‐majoritarian	  mechanisms	  and	  the	  generalized	  disdain	   for	  democratic	   processes	   it	   evinces,	   be	   re-­‐evaluated	   in	   light	   of	   Congress’s	  inability	  to	  pass	  even	  the	  most	  straightforward	  laws	  that	  most	  of	  us	  want,	  and	  that	  
                                                            	   27.	  	   See	  Kimberly	  A.	  Yuracko,	  Education	  off	  the	  Grid:	  Constitutional	  Constraints	  on	  Homeschooling,	  96	  CAL.	   L.	   REV.	   101	   (2008);	   Rob	   Reich,	   The	   Civic	   Perils	   of	   Homeschooling,	   59	   EDUC.	   56	   (2002),	  http://www.ascd.org/publications/educational-­‐leadership/apr02/vol59/num07/The-­‐Civic-­‐Perils-­‐of-­‐Homeschooling.aspx.	  	   28.	  	   See	  Randy	  E.	  Barnett,	  The	  Presumption	  of	  Liberty	  and	  the	  Public	   Interest:	  Medical	  Marijuana	  and	  
Fundamental	  Rights,	  22	  WASH.	  U.	  J.L.	  &	  POL’Y	  29	  (2009).	  	   29.	  	   See	  Randy	  E.	  Barnett,	  Is	  the	  Constitution	  Libertarian?,	  2009	  CATO	  SUP.	  CT.	  REV.	  9	  (2009).	  	   30.	  	   See	  Randy	  Barnett,	  Commentary,	  10	  SETON	  HALL	  CONST.	  L.J.	  849	  (1999);	  Levinson,	  supra	  note	  24.	  
See	  also	  District	  of	  Columbia	  v.	  Heller,	  554	  U.S.	  570	  (2008).	  	   31.	  	   See	  Barnett,	  supra	  note	  29;	  Victoria	  F.	  Nourse,	  A	  Tale	  of	  Two	  Lochners:	  The	  Untold	  History	  of	  Sub-­‐
stantive	  Due	  Process	  and	  the	  Idea	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights,	  97	  CALIF.	  L.	  REV.	  751	  (2009).	  	   32.	  	   Ronald	  Dworkin,	  The	  Decision	  That	  Threatens	  Democracy,	  N.Y.	  REV.	  OF	  BOOKS	  (May	  13,	  2010).	  	   33.	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  Susan	  J.	  Stabile,	  State	  Attempts	  to	  Define	  Religion:The	  Ramifications	  of	  Applying	  Mandato-­‐
ry	   Prescription	   Contraceptive	   Coverage	   Statutes	   to	   Religious	   Employers,	   28	   HARV.	   J.L.	   &	   PUB.	   POL’Y	   741	  (2005);	  Katherine	  A.	  White,	  Crisis	  of	  Conscience:	  Reconciling	  Religions	  Health	  Care	  Providers’	  Beliefs	  and	  
Patients’	  Rights,	  51	  STAN.	  L.	  REV.	  1703	  (1999).	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seem	  essential	  to	  protect	  the	  planet,	  the	  economy,	  or	  the	  public’s	  safety?34	  Is	  its	  evi-­‐dent	   constraint	   on	   our	   lawmaking	   capacities	   hurting	   our	   collective	   future	   more	  than	  it	  is	  propping	  up	  our	  individual	  and	  corporate	  freedoms?	  Should	  the	  executive	  branch’s	   thirst	   for	   unnecessary	  wars,	   drone	   strikes,	   targeted	   assassinations,	   state	  secrets,	   and	   torture,	   as	   evidenced	  by	  both	  of	   the	   last	   two	  presidents	   from	  starkly	  opposing	  ideologies	  and	  parties,	  suggest	  the	  need	  for	  such	  a	  re-­‐evaluation?	  In	  fact,	  by	  contrast	  to	  the	  first	  branch’s	  present	  inability	  to	  do	  anything	  at	  all,	  and	  the	  exec-­‐utive	  branch’s	  proclivity	   to	  do	  a	  great	  deal	   too	  much,	   the	  Court’s	  handling	  of	   indi-­‐vidual	   rights	   cases,	   while	   occasionally	   worthy	   of	   either	   celebration	   or	   concern,	  might	  be	   the	   least	  of	  our	  constitutional	  problems;	   it	  might	  be	   the	  only	  part	  of	   the	  Constitution’s	  tripartite	  scheme	  that	  seems	  to	  be	  still,	  somewhat,	  functioning	  as	  in-­‐tended,	   and	   not	   in	   terribly	   pernicious	   ways.	   By	   contrast,	   the	   problems,	   some	   of	  them	  constitutional,	  besetting	  Congress	  and	  the	  Executive	  Branch	  seem	  to	  be	  truly	  paradigm	  shifting,	  at	  least	  in	  our	  constitutional	  scholarship.	  Is	  the	  Constitution	  itself	  really	  worth	  defending	   anymore,	  much	   less	   celebrating,	  with	  or	  without	   the	  mar-­‐ginal	   changes	   to	   its	   individual	   rights	   doctrine	   of	   the	   sort	   Brettschneider,	   Fleming	  and	  McClain	  propose?	  There	  is	  virtually	  none	  of	  this	  “constitutional	  skepticism”	  in	  either	  book.	  All	  three	  authors	  operate	  squarely	  within	  the	  traditions	  of	  a	  robust,	  lib-­‐eral,	  constitutional	  faith.	  Historically	   and	  methodologically	   minded	   constitutional	   theorists	   have	   also	  shifted	   ground,	   and	   they	   have	   done	   so	   more	   or	   less	   against	   the	   methodological	  thrust	  of	  both	  books.	  Even	  celebrants	  of	  robust	  constitutional	  rights	  have	   increas-­‐ingly	   shifted	   away	   from	   the	   idea	   of	   an	   evolving	  or	   living	   constitution	  with	   its	   pe-­‐numbral	  rights,	  and	  in	  particular	  those	  penumbral	  rights	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  con-­‐traception	   and	   abortion	   cases,	   and	   have	   refocused	   their	   attention	   on	   historical	  sources,	  originalism,	  strict	  construction,	  and	  textualism	  as	  primary	  justifications	  of	  those	   rights,35	   leavened	   by,	   at	   most,	   a	   begrudging	   acceptance	   of	   a	   constitutional	  common	   law	   that	   can	   unquestionably	   shift,	   or	   shape,	   our	   received	   constitutional	  history.36	  Yet,	   just	  as	   there	   is	  virtually	  no	  mention	  of	   the	  Lochnerian	  revival,	  or	  of	  constitutional	   skepticism,	   there	   is	   little	   to	   none	   of	   this	   relatively	   new	   turn	   to	  originalism	  and	   textualism	   in	  either	  book:	   the	  arguments	  all	   sound	   in	   late	   twenti-­‐eth-­‐century-­‐styled	  traditionally	  liberal	  constitutional	  theory,	  which	  presupposes	  an	  evolving	  and	  even	  anti-­‐historical	  Constitution.	  Fleming	  and	  McClain	  are	  not	  one	  bit	  bothered	   by	   the	   lack	   of	   textual	   grounding	   for	   the	   abortion	   right	   or	   the	   same-­‐sex	  marriage	  right	  they	  defend;	  they	  do	  not	  discuss	  it	  one	  way	  or	  the	  other.	  The	  argu-­‐ments	   against	   the	   rights	   that	  do	   concern	   them,	   and	  which	   they	   treat	  with	   a	   great	  deal	   of	   respect	   and	   care,	   are	   entirely	  moral	   and	   not	   grounded	   in	   Borkean-­‐styled	  complaints	  about	  fidelity	  to	  text.	  Brettschneider	  likewise	  shows	  almost	  no	  interest	  in	   the	   political	   or	   constitutional	   histories	   of	   hate	   speech,	   beyond	   what	   can	   be	  
                                                            	   34.	  	   See	   SANFORD	   LEVINSON,	   OUR	   UNDEMOCRATIC	   CONSTITUTION	   (2006);	   LOUIS	   MICHAEL	   SEIDMAN,	   ON	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  DISOBEDIENCE	  (2012);	  Waldron,	  supra	  note	  8;	  Robin	  L.	  West,	  Constitutional	  Scepticism,	  72	  B.U.	  L.	  REV.	  765	  (1992).	  	   35.	  	   See	   Jack	   M.	   Balkin,	   Framework	   Originalism	   and	   the	   Living	   Constitution,	   103	   NW.	   U.	   L.	   REV.	   549	  (2009);	  Jack	  M.	  Balkin,	  The	  New	  Originalism	  and	  the	  Uses	  of	  History,	  82	  FORDHAM	  L.	  REV.	  641	  (2013).	  	   36.	  	   See	  David	  Strauss,	  Common	  Law	  Constitutional	  Interpretation,	  63	  U.	  CHI.	  L.	  REV.	  877	  (1996).	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gleaned	   from	   canonical	   First	   Amendment	   cases.	   Arguments	   for	   the	   doctrines	   and	  even	  more	  so	  for	  the	  doctrinal	  changes	  both	  books	  propose,	  are	  grounded,	  loosely,	  in	  Dworkinian	  premises.	  Both	  books	  aim	  to	  make	  the	  Constitution	  the	  best	  it	  can	  be,	  given	  sound	  but	  evolving	  principles	  of	  political	  morality,	  and	  the	  constraints	  of	  past	  “institutional	   settlements”	   such	   as	   precedent,	   text	   and	   history.37	   It	   is,	   in	   other	  words,	   an	   evolving	   Constitution	   these	   books	   are	   expounding,	  with	   plenty	   of	   cita-­‐tions	  to	  John	  Rawls,38	  Ronald	  Dworkin,39	  and	  John	  Stuart	  Mill,40	  and	  a	  smattering	  of	  references	   to	  Nozick,41	   but	   far	   fewer	   to	  Madison,	  Hamilton	   and	   the	  Federalist	   Pa-­‐pers.	  This	  methodological	  choice	  also	  affects	   the	  choice	  of	  subject	  matter:	   federal-­‐ism,	  state-­‐national	  government	  relations,	  and	  the	  separation	  of	  powers	  loom	  large	  in	  contemporary	  originalist	  debates,	  but	   there	   is	   little	   to	  none	  of	  any	  of	   that	   in	  ei-­‐ther	  book.	  So,	  there	  is	  a	  bit	  of	  a	  mismatch,	  just	  in	  terms	  of	  subject	  matter,	  between	  these	  books	  and	  the	  rights,	  method,	  and	  general	  stance	  toward	  constitutionalism	  that	  are	  of	  most	   interest	   to	   contemporary	   constitutional	   theorists.	   	   For	  both	   reasons—the	  somewhat	  dated	  feel	  to	  the	  issues	  chosen	  and	  the	  generally	  celebratory	  stance	  tak-­‐en	   toward	   the	  evolving	  Constitution—both	  books	  might	   find	  a	  more	   limited	  audi-­‐ence	   than	   they	   deserve.	   For	   better	   or	   worse,	   perhaps,	   our	   appetite	   for	   extended	  scholarly	   treatments	   of	   the	   classic	   individual	   rights	   “paradoxes”	   and	   conundrums	  that	  absorb	  these	  books—that	  liberal	  rights	  create	  insular	  and	  constitutionally	  pro-­‐tected	  zones	  within	  which	  liberal	  values	  are	  routinely	  attacked,	  or	  that	  rights	  of	  pri-­‐vacy	   intended	   in	  part	   to	  strengthen	  and	  underscore	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  citizen-­‐ship	  might	  actually	  undermine	  them―is	  weakening.	  That	  would,	  I	  think,	  be	  a	  shame.	  In	  part	  because	  the	  books	  are	  somewhat	  out	  of	  step	  with	  contemporary	  debates,	   they	  are	  more	  than	  worth	  attending.	  The	  gen-­‐eral	   theme	   that	   unites	   these	   books—that	   liberal	   constitutionalism	   is	   a	   morally	  worthwhile	  project	  of	  governance,	  and	  would	  be	  all	  the	  better	  were	  its	  proponents	  and	  devotees	  to	  self-­‐consciously	  grapple	  with	  issues	  of	  responsibilities,	  whether	  of	  states	   or	   citizens—is	  well	   taken.	   It	   seems	   sound,	   and	   important.	   And,	   there	   is	   no	  question	  but	  that	  the	  liberal	  faith	  that	  McClain	  and	  Fleming,	  and	  Brettschneider	  are	  all	  defending	  is	  endangered,	  and	  could	  use	  reinvigorating.	  Old	  fashioned	  U.S.-­‐styled	  liberalism,	   liberal	  constitutionalism	  and	  liberal	  rights	  all	  need	  their	  defenders,	  not	  only	   against	   the	   proponents	   of	   hate	   speech,	   worldwide	   as	   well	   as	   domestic,	   and	  against	   left	  or	  communitarian	  critics	  of	   liberalism,	  and	  against	  purportedly	   liberal	  states	   themselves	   which	   undermine	   their	   own	   legitimating	   principles	   on	   a	   de-­‐pressingly	   routine	   basis,	   but	   also	   against	   those	   of	   us	  whose	   attention	   has	   simply	  moved	  on.	  
                                                            	   37.	  	   See	  RONALD	  DWORKIN,	  LAW’S	  EMPIRE	  (1986);	  RONALD	  DWORKIN,	  TAKING	  RIGHTS	  SERIOUSLY	  (1978).	  	   38.	  	   BRETTSCHNEIDER,	   supra	   note	   1,	   at	   19,	   30–31,	   34–35,	   39,	   53–55,	   59,	   67–68,	   73,	   75–76,	   108,	   113,	  142–43,	  154–55,	  158–59;	  FLEMING	  &	  MCCLAIN,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  107-­‐17,	  9-­‐10,	  46,	  87-­‐99,	  10,	  83-­‐89,	  157,	  148-­‐51,	  183-­‐90.	  	  	   39.	  	   BRETTSCHNEIDER,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  20–21,	  73,	  75–77,	  78–79;	  FLEMING	  &	  MCCLAIN,	  supra	  note	  2	  at	  1-­‐7,	  13,	  32-­‐36,	  40-­‐43,	  46-­‐49,	  50-­‐52,	  62-­‐69,	  77-­‐78,	  93,	  97,	  148-­‐49,	  177-­‐78,	  189,	  207,	  209-­‐10,	  225-­‐27,	  233-­‐37.	  	   40.	   BRETTSCHNEIDER,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  13,	  42–43,	  66,	  69,	  77–78,	  93,	  97,	  FLEMING	  &	  MCCLAIN,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  93,	  31-­‐32,	  41-­‐42,	  47.	  	  	  	   41.	   BRETTSCHNEIDER,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  88.	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That	   inattention	   is	   a	   failure	   of	   responsibility	   that	   brings	   us	   full	   circle	   to	   the	  shared	  interest	  of	  both	  books:	  liberal	  rights’	  connections	  to	  liberal	  responsibilities.	  As	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  my	  conclusion	  below,	  perhaps	  the	  greatest	  threat	  to	  the	  Ameri-­‐can	   liberal	   faith	   today	   is	   simply	   that	  both	  citizens	  and	  officials	   increasingly	   fail	   to	  attend	   to	   even	  minimal	   understandings	  of	   the	   responsibilities	   of	   public-­‐regarding	  governance	  in	  a	  liberal	  state,	  whether	  this	  one	  or	  any	  other.	  The	  balanced	  and	  emi-­‐nently	  sane	  approach	  all	   three	  authors	  of	   these	  two	  books	  take	  toward	  rights	  and	  responsibilities	   might	   at	   least	   be	   balm	   for	   a	   seriously	   disturbed	   liberal	   spirit.	   It	  should	  also,	   though,	  begin	  a	  conversation,	  among	  liberal	  constitutionalists	  and	  be-­‐tween	   them	   and	   their	   critics,	   that	   could	   point	   us	   toward	   a	   re-­‐enlivened	   but	   also	  more	  responsible	  conception	  of	  what	  a	  liberal	  state	  requires	  of	  us	  all.	  In	  the	  sections	  below,	  I	  will	  very	  briefly	  elaborate	  that	  theme,	  and	  seek	  to	  ex-­‐pand	  on	  it,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  friendly	  amendments	  that	  might	  not	  be	  too	  uncongenial	  to	  the	   authors’	   concerns.	   First,	   though,	   I	  will	   review	  and	   comment	  on	   each	  book	   se-­‐quentially.	  Both	  books	  make	  important	  contributions,	  and	  I	  do	  not	  want	  my	  critical	  commentary	  to	  undercut	  my	  appreciation	  of	  those	  contributions.	  Of	  the	  two,	  Flem-­‐ing	   and	  McClain’s	   book	   is	   far	  more	   exhaustive	   and	   theoretically	   ambitious—it	   at-­‐tempts	   a	   wholesale	   reinterpretation	   of	   large	   swaths	   of	   constitutional	   doctrine—while	   Brettschneider’s	   is	  more	   pointed—for	   the	  most	   part	   he	   sticks	   to	   one	   issue,	  that	   of	   hate	   speech.	   Brettschneider’s	  might	   also,	   though,	   be	   the	  more	   doctrinally	  imaginative;	  the	  reform	  he	  suggests	  to	  our	  First	  Amendment	  law	  and	  theory	  is	  orig-­‐inal	  and	  interesting.	  I	  will	  start	  with	  Brettschneider’s	  book	  in	  the	  first	  section	  below	  and	  then	  move	  on	  to	  Fleming	  and	  McClain’s.	  I.	  	  LIBERTY,	  EQUALITY,	  AND	  STATE	  RESPONSIBILITIES	  Corey	  Brettschneider’s	  When	  the	  State	  Speaks42	  confronts	  a	  core	  dilemma	  for	  liberalism	   and	   indeed	   for	   liberal	   states:	   how	   (and	  whether)	   liberal	   states	   can	   re-­‐spond	   to	   the	   existence	   of	   hateful	   speech,	   practices,	   and	   the	   groups	   that	   sponsor	  them	  and	  promote	  them,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  checks	  the	  damage	  the	  hateful	  speech	  does	  to	  underlying	  liberal	  principles	  of	  free	  and	  equal	  citizenship,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  respecting	   the	  rights	  as	  well	  as	   the	   free	  and	  equal	  citizenship	  of	   the	  speakers	  and	  groups	  that	  engage	  in	  it.	  Brettschneider	  rejects	  both	  of	  what	  he	  considers	  to	  be	  the	  two	  polar	  responses	  that	  pervade	  state	  responses,	  both	  here	  and	  elsewhere,	  to	  this	  dilemma,	  and	  that	  virtually	  exhaust	  the	  scholarly	  treatment	  of	   the	   issue.	  Likewise,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Canada:	  the	  civil	  libertarian	  (or	  “neutralist”	  and	  for	  the	  most	  part	  the	  American	  claim	  that	  private	  speech	  is	  just	  that—private—and	  therefore	  of	  no	  concern	  or	  relevance	  to	  public	  values,	  public	  deliberation,	  or	  public	  law.	  Accord-­‐ingly,	   the	   state	   and	   the	   larger	   community	  both	   simply	  have	  no	   interest	   in	  private	  speech	  and	  should	  refrain	  from	  sanctioning	  or	  criminalizing	  it	  in	  any	  way,43	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  that	  of	  “militant	  democrats”44	  (his	  phrase),	  some	  feminists,	  and	   most	   of	   the	   European	   liberal	   democracies,	   who	   argue	   that	   private	   hateful	  
                                                            	   42.	  	   BRETTSCHNEIDER,	  supra	  note	  1.	  	   43.	  	   Id.	  at	  1-­‐3,	  9.	  	   44.	  	   Id.	  at	  5.	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speech	  has	  very	  harmful	  and	  fully	  intended	  consequences	  and	  should	  be	  banned	  or	  censored	  in	  some	  meaningful	  way	  to	  stop	  its	  noxious	  spread.45	  	  These	  two	  poles,	  Brettschneider	  argues,	  veer	  toward	  one	  or	  the	  other	  of	  two	  dystopian	  visions	  of	   the	  relation	  of	   the	  state	   to	   its	   citizens:	   the	   “militant	  egalitari-­‐an’s”	  view,	  which	  urges	  greater	   criminalization	  of	  hate	   speech,	  risks	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  “Invasive	  State,”	  meaning	  a	  state	  overly	  involved	  in	  our	  private	  lives—the	  tradi-­‐tional	  bogeyman	  of	  civil	  libertarians	  everywhere.46	  The	  liberal	  or	  neutralist	  view,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  according	  to	  which	  the	  state	  is	  and	  should	  be	  fundamentally	  uncon-­‐cerned	  with	   the	   content	   of	   private	   speech,	   no	  matter	   how	  hateful	   or	   indeed	   how	  consequentially	   harmful,	   risks	   what	   he	   calls	   the	   “Hateful	   Society,”	   a	   dystopia	   in	  which	  all	   rights	  and	   liberties	  are	  vigorously	  protected,	  but	  hate	   runs	   like	  an	  open	  sewer,	  undercutting	  the	  reasons	  we	  have	  rights	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  and	  with	  the	  con-­‐sequence	   that	  some	  groups	  of	  citizens—women,	  racial	  minorities,	  gay	  and	   lesbian	  citizens—are	   frequently	   and	   even	   routinely	   subjected	   to	  hateful	   practices	   and	  ut-­‐terances.47	  The	  question	  he	   raises	   and	   tries	   to	   answer	   in	   the	  book	   is	  how	  we	   can	  avoid	  both	  the	  Hateful	  Society,	  in	  which	  rights	  are	  protected	  but	  hate	  runs	  rampant	  and	  rabid,	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  with	  inequality	  spiraling	  out	  of	  control	  and	  a	  lesser	  regard	  for	  the	  equality	  of	  us	  all	  as	   its	  clear	  result,	  and	  the	  Invasive	  State,	   in	  which	  hate	  is	  checked,	  but	  the	  state	  is	  a	  far	  too	  intrusive	  censor	  into	  our	  private	  lives,	  and	  not	  just	  hate	  speech,	  but	  all	  speech,	  thought,	  innovation,	  and	  eccentricity	  are	  chilled,	  compromising	  the	  joys	  those	  deeply	  human	  activities	  and	  attributes	  bring.	  Brettschneider’s	  provocative	  suggestion	  is	  to	  introduce	  a	  third	  possibility,	  ful-­‐ly	  captured	  by	  his	  introduction	  and	  then	  descriptive	  account	  of	  what	  we	  might	  call	  (although	  he	  doesn't	  use	   the	  phrase)	   the	   “persuasive	  state.”	  The	  Persuasive	  State,	  unlike	  the	  Invasive	  State,	  refrains	  from	  coercion,	  and	  thus	  avoids	  its	  pitfalls,	  but	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  does	  not	  deny	   the	  relevance	   to	  public	  values	  of	  privately	  held	  and	  promulgated	   hateful	   beliefs,	   including	   those	   promulgated	   within	   the	   family	   and	  within	   religious	   traditions.48	   It	   can	   thereby	  at	   least	   attend	   to,	  whether	   it	   can	   fully	  counter,	  the	  dangers	  of	  the	  Hateful	  Society.49	  The	  State’s	  response	  to	  the	  holders	  of	  hateful	  beliefs,	  Brettschneider	  believes,	  should	  be	  to	  seek	  to	  persuade	  those	  citizens	  to	  transform,	  modify,	  or	  drop	  their	  hateful	  beliefs	  to	  whatever	  extent	  those	  beliefs	  conflict	   with	   public	   democratic	   values,	   notably,	   values	   of	   free	   and	   equal	   citizen-­‐ship.	  The	  state	  should	  in	  effect	  counter	  hateful	  speech	  with	  the	  argument	  that	  hate-­‐ful	  beliefs	  undercut	  the	  very	  values	  of	  free	  and	  equal	  citizenship	  that	  undergird	  the	  rights	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  holders	  of	  those	  beliefs	  themselves.	  Perhaps	  those	  with	  hate-­‐ful	  views	  will	  be	  persuaded,	  and	  will	  drop	  the	  views.	  But	  even	  if	  not,	  other	  citizens	  will	  hear	  the	  dialogue,	  with	  the	  result	  being	  that	  the	  state	  will	  have	  been	  respectful	  of	   the	  equal	   rights	  of	  all,	   and	  will	  not	  have	  been	  complicit	   in	   the	  spread	  of	  beliefs	  that	  fundamentally	  undercut	  democracy.	  Indeed,	  the	  state	  has	  a	  moral	  responsibil-­‐ity	  to	  engage	  in	  this	  speech.	  It	  owes	  it	  to	  the	  victims	  of	  the	  hate	  speech	  it	  protects,	  
                                                            	   45.	  	   Id.	  at	  1-­‐3.	  	   46.	  	   Id.	  at	  10.	  	   47.	  	   Id.	  at	  10-­‐11.	  	   48.	  	   Id.	  at	  12-­‐19.	  	   49.	  	   Id.	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and	  to	  the	  larger	  project	  of	  constitutionalism	  and	  liberalism	  both.	  It	   is	  essential	  to	  the	  stability,	   fraternity,	  and	  equality	  of	  the	  community	  that	  the	  hate	  speech	  it	  pro-­‐tects	  seeks	  to	  undermine.	  I	  am	  largely	  sympathetic	  to	  this	  project.	  I	  think	  it	  is	  entirely	  right	  for	  us	  to	  rec-­‐ognize	  the	  relevance	  of	  private	  hateful	  beliefs	  to	  public	  values,	  such	  as	  equality	  and	  freedom,	  equal	  respect,	  and	  due	  regard,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  entirely	  right	  as	  well	  for	  us	  to	  shift	  our	   focus,	   somewhat,	   from	  our	  worries	  concerning	   the	  overuse	  of	   the	  state’s	  coercive	  role	  to	  the	  possible	  good	  a	  state	  can	  do	  when	  it	  acts	  in	  its	  persuasive	  capac-­‐ity.	  And,	  I	  think	  it	  is	  right	  and	  extremely	  important	  that	  we	  shift	  our	  focus	  in	  our	  de-­‐bates	  over	  hate	   speech	   to	   the	   state’s	   responsibilities	   to	   respond	   to	   it,	   rather	   than	  individuals’	   rights	   to	   engage	   in	   it.	   It	   is	   a	   refreshing	   change	   of	   focus:	   what	   is	   the	  state’s	   responsibility,	   rather	   than	   the	   individual’s	   right,	   and	  what	  should	   the	  state	  say	  in	  response?	  Brettschneider	  shows	  us	  how	  to	  think	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  fully	  moral	  actor	   in	   this	   ongoing	   liberal	   project,	   rather	   than	   the	   two	   roles	   our	   traditional	   de-­‐bates	   on	   this	   issue	   have	   articulated	   for	   it:	   the	   generator	   of	   unconstitutional	   laws	  that	   inhibit	  speech,	  or	   the	  sometimes	  overly	  zealous	  protector	  of	   individual	  rights	  to	  engage	  in	  it.	  The	  state	  is	  more	  complex	  than	  that,	  and	  can	  engage	  in	  multi-­‐tasking	  with	  the	  best	  of	  us.	  One	  thing	  it	  can	  and	  should	  do,	  Brettschneider	  wisely	  points	  out,	  is	  publicly	  make	  the	  case	  for	  the	  liberty	  and	  equality	  for	  which	  rights	  exist,	  particu-­‐larly	  where	   the	  speech	   those	  rights	  protect	  undermine	   them.50	  That	   insight	  alone,	  and	   that	  prescriptive	  suggestion	   for	  change,	   is	  a	  contribution	   to	  First	  Amendment	  doctrine	  and	  theory,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  equality.	  But	  there	  are	  problems,	  largely	  of	  coherence,	  that	  make	  it	  hard	  to	  understand	  the	   full	   import	   of	   Brettschneider’s	   proposal.	   I	   will	   focus	   on	   three	   such	   problems,	  and	  then	  I	  will	  take	  up	  some	  more	  substantive	  objections.	  All	  of	  these	  objections	  are	  answerable,	  and	  I	  will	  suggest	  some	  ways	  to	  do	  so	  as	  I	  go.	  So,	   on	   to	   the	   problems	   of	   coherence.	   First,	   it	   is	   truly	   difficult	   to	   understand	  who	  and	  what	  Brettschneider	  is	  talking	  about,	  when	  he	  talks	  about	  state	  speech,	  or	  what	  he	  could	  possibly	  envision,	  by	  suggesting	  that	  the	  state	  take	  up	  the	  (extremely	  phallic	  looking)	  microphone	  pictured	  on	  the	  front	  jacket	  cover	  of	  this	  book	  and	  use	  it.	  The	   state	  does,	   after	   all,	   always	  and	  already	  as	   they	   say,	   speak,	   and	  attempt	   to	  persuade,	   constantly.	  It	   is	   never	   quiet.	  The	   state	   speaks	   when	   it	   passes	   laws;	   it	  speaks	  when	   it	   justifies	   them	   in	   judicial	   decisions;	   it	   speaks	  when	   it	   promulgates	  administrative	   regulations	   and	   when	   it	   adjudicates	   those	   regulations;	   it	   speaks	  when	  it	  imposes	  sanctions	  in	  civil	  cases;	  it	  speaks	  when	  it	  educates	  children	  in	  pub-­‐lic	  schools;	  and	  it	  speaks	  when	  it	   imprisons	  and	  fines	  and	  executes	  people.	  Almost	  all	   of	   that	   speech,	   furthermore,	   is	   “persuasive.”	   Persuasive	   State	   speech	   is	   as	  pre-­‐sent	  as	  air.	  Of	   course	   the	  state	  could	  and	  should	  use	   its	   rhetorical	  powers	   to	  pro-­‐mote	  liberal	  values	  of	  equality	  and	  freedom,	  equal	  respect,	  due	  regard,	  and	  human	  dignity.	  It	  already	  does	  this,	  obviously,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  it	  should	  not	  be	  urged	  to	  do	  so	  more,	  and	  to	  do	  so	  more	  reflectively	  and	  effectively.	  And,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  it	  should	  not	  do	  so	  in	  the	  specific	  context	  of	  hate	  speech	  and	  pornography.	  This	   is	  what	  I	  take	  Brettschneider	  to	  be	  urging,	  and	  I	  support	  the	  effort.	  	  
                                                            	   50.	  	   Id.	  at	  13-­‐14.	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It	  would	  be	  a	  much	  clearer	  proposal,	  though,	  if	  Brettschneider	  specified	  what	  sort	  of	  speechifying	  he	  has	  in	  mind.	  In	  the	  last	  chapter,	  he	  suggests	  doctrinal	  chang-­‐es	   to	   our	   First	   Amendment	   case	   law	   that	   would	   give	   executive	   branch	   officials	  greater	   latitude	   to	   deny	   tax	   exemptions	   and	   deductions	   (as	   well	   as	   affirmative	  grants)	  to	  even	  purportedly	  religious	  groups	  that	  engage	  in	  hate	  speech.51	  That	  is	  an	  intriguing	  suggestion,	  and	  gives	  some	  content	  to	  an	  otherwise	  pretty	  vague	  sugges-­‐tion:	  “persuasion”	  apparently	  includes	  the	  act	  of	  denying	  tax	  exemptions	  and	  with-­‐holding	  economic	  tax	  dollar	  support,	  and	  the	  “persuasive	  state”	  apparently	  includes	  the	   state	   that	   so	  withholds.	  But	  Brettschneider	   seems	   to	  have	   in	  mind	  more	   than	  this	  doctrinal	  change	  that	  comes	  late	  in	  the	  book	  and	  late	  in	  the	  argument.	  It	  would	  have	  been	  helpful	  if	  he	  would	  simply	  provide	  examples	  of	  the	  sorts	  of	  state	  speech	  he	   is	  envisioning,	  beyond	  the	  provision	  of	  symbolic	  holidays,	   in	  which	   the	  state	   is	  not	  already	  engaged.	  A	  thorough	  treatment	  of	  issues	  surrounding	  public	  education	  (he	  does	  give	  it	  cursory	  attention),52	  for	  example,	  from	  struggles	  over	  the	  content	  of	  curricula	  and	  school	  textbooks,	  to	  the	  merits	  and	  perils	  of	  unregulated	  homeschool-­‐ing,	  might	  have	  been	  a	  good	  place	  to	  start,	  in	  putting	  a	  bit	  more	  meat	  on	  the	  bones	  of	   what	   is	   otherwise	   a	   somewhat	   empty,	   although	   aspirational,	   exhortation:	   the	  state	  should	  engage	  in	  more	  liberal	  moralizing.	  I	  will	  suggest	  other	  possibilities	  be-­‐low.	  I	  just	  want	  to	  note	  here	  that	  the	  reader	  has	  to	  get	  to	  almost	  the	  end	  of	  the	  book	  before	   encountering	   a	   single	   example	   of	   the	   sort	   of	   Persuasive	   State	   speech	  Brettschneider	  is	  urging.	  Second,	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   something	   unrealistic,	   and	   a	   bit	   naïve-­‐sounding,	  about	  the	  nature	  of	   the	  hate	  speech	  Brettschneider	  seeks	  both	  to	  protect,	   through	  traditional	  First	  Amendment	  doctrine,	  and	  counter,	   through	  the	  persuasive	  efforts	  of	  the	  liberal	  state.	  Brettschneider	  writes	  as	  though	  that	  speech	  is	  largely	  ideologi-­‐cal,	  spawned	  in	  political	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  KKK,	  private	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  Jaycees,	   or	   in	   families	   that	   have	   and	   transmit	   to	   children	   overtly	   racist	   or	   sexist	  worldviews.53	  The	  counter	  to	  such	  bad	  ideas,	  Brettschneider	  sensibly	  maintains,	  are	  good	   ideas.	  What	   the	   state	   should	  do,	   then,	   about	   these	  groups	  with	   their	  wrong-­‐headed	  and	   inegalitarian	   ideologies,	   is	  not	   censor	   them,	  but	  persuade	   their	  mem-­‐bers	  that	  they	  should	  abandon	  their	  beliefs,	  at	  least	  to	  whatever	  degree	  they	  conflict	  with	  a	  thin	  and	  liberal	  conception	  of	  equal	  and	  free	  citizenship.	  Families	  that	  teach	  their	  daughters	  to	  accept	  a	  lesser	  and	  subordinate	  role	  than	  men,54	  and	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  Jaycees	  that	  teach	  their	  members	  to	  accept	  discriminatory	  membership	  poli-­‐cies,	  or	   the	  Boy	  Scouts	  with	   their	  homophobic	  refusal	   to	  acknowledge	   the	   full	  hu-­‐manity	  of	  gay	  men	  and	  boys,55	  and	  groups	  such	  as	   the	  KKK	   that	   spread	  genocidal	  messages	  of	  hatred	  and	  contempt,56	  should	  not	  be	  censored.	  Rather,	  their	  members	  should	  be	   exhorted	  not	   to	  harbor	   their	   false	  beliefs.	   The	  members	   should	   in	   turn	  listen,	  and	  then	  change	  their	  beliefs	  accordingly.	  (It	  sounds	  a	  bit	  like	  Romney’s	  “self-­‐
                                                            	   51.	  	   Id.	  at	  143-­‐47.	  	  	   52.	  	   Id.	  at	  96-­‐104.	  	  	   53.	  	   Id.	  at	  8,	  72.	  	  	   54.	  	   Id.	  at	  54.	  	  	   55.	  	   Id.	  at	  130-­‐32.	  	   56.	  	   Id.	  at	  8.	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deportation”	  solution	   to	   the	   immigration	  problem).	  The	  state	  should	   in	  effect	   rea-­‐son,	  and	  argue,	  not	  punish.	  If	  it	  does,	  it	  will	  win	  the	  argument,	  and	  that	  is	  that.	  The	  cure	  to	  bad	  speech	  is	  good	  speech,	  or	  so	  the	  state	  says	  in	  other	  contexts.	  The	  state	  should	  practice	  what	  it	  preaches.	  There	   are	   two	   problems	   with	   this	   general	   conception.	   First,	   sometimes,	   at	  least,	  hate	  speech	  is	  motivated	  not	  by	  worked	  out	  noxious	  ideologies,	  such	  as	  a	  doc-­‐trinaire	  belief	   in	  white	   supremacy	  or	  male	  superiority,	  or	  any	  other	  set	  of	  beliefs,	  but	   rather,	   by,	  well,	   hate,	   pure	   and	   simple.	   Its	   targeted	   audience	   is	   not	   society	   in	  general,	   reachable	   through	  marches	  or	   rallies	   in	   the	  public	   square	  with	   signs	  and	  cross	  burnings,	  but	  rather	  a	  particular	  teenage	  girl,	  or	  a	  gay	  boy,	  or	  an	  insecure	  and	  vulnerable	  tween,	  targeted	  through	  harassing	  speech	  and	  images	  on	  Facebook.	  That	  harassing	   and	   harmful	   speech	   spawns	   not	   just	   feelings	   of	   inferiority,	   but	   self-­‐inflicted	  cuttings,	  eating	  disorders,	  and	  suicides.	  What	  prompts	  it?	  Of	  course	  some-­‐times	  ideology	  plays	  a	  role:	   the	  harasser	  thinks	  wrongly	  that	  women,	  or	  gay	  boys,	  or	   black	   children	   are	   of	   lesser	   worth.	   If	   he	   or	   she	   could	   simply	   understand	   the	  wrongness	  of	  that	  belief	  the	  behavior	  would	  stop.	  But	  at	  least	  sometimes,	  and	  per-­‐haps	  more	  often	  than	  not,	  that	  speech	  is	  the	  product	  of	  twisted	  psyches	  rather	  than	  noxious	  beliefs—not	   the	   sort	   of	  mindset	   to	  be	   changed	   through	  Persuasive	   State-­‐sponsored	  speech.	  Brettschneider	  seems	  to	  have	  forgotten,	  or	  just	  underplayed	  the	  role	  of	   the	  “hate”	   in	   the	  hate	  speech	  he	  rightly	  deplores.	  Hate	  speech	   is	  not	  solely	  the	  product	  of	  wrong	  beliefs.	  It	  is	  also	  the	  product,	  in	  part,	  of	  hate.57	  Second,	  and	  relatedly,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  even	  know	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  Brettschnei-­‐der’s	  apparent	  insistence	  that	  it	  is	  morally	  incumbent	  upon	  people	  who	  hold	  these	  noxious	   views	   to	   change	   them	   so	   that	   they	   accord	  with	   the	  minimal	   decency	   re-­‐quired	  by	   liberal	  principles,	  and	  that	  the	  state	  should	  be	  engaged	  in	  the	  project	  of	  exhorting	  them	  to	  do	  so.58	  It	  is	  morally	  incumbent	  upon	  everyone	  who	  harbors	  the-­‐se	  false	  beliefs,	  in	  other	  words,	  to	  listen	  to	  the	  state’s	  arguments	  against	  them,	  and	  change	  their	  beliefs	  accordingly.	  Huh?	  Really?	  The	  families	  that	  keep	  their	  children	  home	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  the	  liberalizing	  content	  of	  a	  public	  school	  education,	  and	  teach	  their	  daughters	  submissive	  and	  lesser	  roles,	  or	  the	  boy	  who	  torments	  his	  gay	  peers,	  or	  the	  white	  housewife	  who	  despises	  her	  black	  neighbors	  and	  lets	  them	  know	  it—they	   all,	   presumably,	   hate	   the	   liberal	   state	   and	   its	   exhortative,	   persuading	   liberal	  ways,	  at	  least	  as	  much	  or	  more	  as	  they	  hate	  the	  loosely	  liberal	  feminist	  and	  egalitar-­‐ian	  ideas	  of	  gender	  and	  race	  equality	  the	  liberal	  state	  promulgates.59	  	  Like	  teenagers	  who	  are	  spurred	  on	  to	  double	  their	  consumption	  of	  cigarettes	  and	  alcohol	  by	  public	  health	   campaigns,	   surely	   illiberalists	  will	   be	   spurred	   to	   greater	   contempt	   for	   any	  state	  that	  tries	  to	  persuade	  them	  out	  of	  their	  entrenched	  habits	  of	  thought,	  feeling	  and	   child	   raising—habits	   that	   have	   at	   their	   core,	   not	   periphery,	   fear	   of	   and	   con-­‐tempt	  for	  a	  state	  that	  preaches	  liberal	  values.	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  know	  even	  what	  is	  meant	  by	   the	  claim	   that	   the	   liberal	   state	  should	  exhort	  people	  who	  hate	   the	   liberal	   state	  
                                                            	   57.	  	   For	   a	   very	   different	   description,	   see	   DANIELLE	   CITRON,	   HATE	   3.0:	   A	   CIVIL	   RIGHTS	   MOVEMENT	   TO	  COMBAT	  DISCRIMINATORY	  ONLINE	  HARASSMENT	  (forthcoming).	  	   58.	  	   BRETTSCHNEIDER,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  88-­‐89.	  	   59.	  	   For	  an	  account	  from	  a	  judicial	  decision	  adjudicating	  a	  conflict	  between	  such	  a	  family	  and	  a	  public	  school,	  see	  Mozert	  v.	  Hawkins	  Cnty.	  Bd.	  of	  Educ.,	  827	  F.2d	  1058	  (6th	  Cir.	  1987).	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precisely	   because	   of	   its	   tendency	   toward	   exhortation	   of	   views	   they	   despise,	   to	  change	  those	  illiberal	  beliefs	  precisely	  because	  they	  are	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  liberal	  val-­‐ues	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  liberal	  state	  they	  hate.	  One	  could	  say,	  I	  hate	  the	  state,	  because	  it	  beats	  up	  on	  me,	  so	  the	  solution	  to	  this	  problem	  is	  to	  direct	  the	  state	  to	  beat	  up	  on	  me	  some	  more	  so	  I	  will	  change	  my	  beliefs	  that	  a	  bullying	  state	  that	  beats	  up	  on	  me	  is	  something	   I	  hate?	  Substitute	   “persuades	  me”	  or	   “exhorts	  me”	   for	   “beats	  me	  up”	  and	  you	  get	  the	  problem.	  The	  very	  attempt	  at	  persuasion	  will	  underscore	  precisely	  what	  extreme	  anti-­‐liberals	  find	  so	  hateful	  about	  the	  liberal	  state.	  It	  is	  what	  spurs	  the	  fringes	  among	  them	  to	  arm	  themselves	   in	  defense	  of	  black	  helicopters.	  Persuasive	  exhortatory	  P.C.	  talk	  by	  the	  liberal	  state,	  in	  other	  words,	  will	  backfire;	  just	  ask	  any	  teenager.	  There	  has	  to	  be	  another	  way.	  So,	   the	  proposal	  simply	  would	  have	  been	  stronger	  had	  Brettschneider	  speci-­‐fied	  more	  carefully	  the	  kind	  of	  hate	  speech	  he	  is	  targeting,	  and	  the	  kinds	  of	  respons-­‐es	  that	  are	  envisioned,	  when	  he	  speaks	  of	  acts	  of	  state	  persuasion.	  Now	  for	  the	  substantive	  problems	  with	  the	  proposal	  itself:	  that	  the	  state’s	  re-­‐sponse	  to	  hate	  speech,	  contra	  the	  censorship	  urged	  by	  militant	  democrats	  and	  the	  blind	  eye	  turned	  by	  civil	  libertarians,	  should	  be	  to	  engage	  in	  various	  acts	  of	  persua-­‐sion.	   There	   are	   three	   separate	   problems	   that	   I	   see.	   The	   first	   is	   a	   general	   worry	  about	  the	  way	  Brettschneider	  has	  characterized	  the	  persuasive	  state	  as	  an	  alterna-­‐tive	  to	  his	  two	  dystopias:	  the	  Invasive	  State	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  Hateful	  Society	  on	   the	   other.	  Brettschneider’s	   Persuasive	   State	   is	   a	   well-­‐intentioned,	   completely	  functional,	  and	  thoroughly	  liberal	  state,	  not	  beset	  by	  public	  choice	  woes,	  or	  admin-­‐istrative	  capture,	  or	  excessive	  corporate	  and	  private	  power,	  or	  know-­‐nothing	  vot-­‐ers,	  politicians	  and	  their	  political	  parties,	  or	  noxious	  factionalism,	  or	  sagging	  econ-­‐omies,	   or	   even	   external	   threats.	   It	   is	   a	   pretty	   utopian	   state.	  Of	   course,	   it	   is	   also	   a	  hypothetical	  and	   idealized	  construct,	  meant	   to	  rhetorically	  counter	   the	  two	  dysto-­‐pias	  he	  portrays,	  and	  which	  are	  implied	  by	  the	  poles	  of	  debate	  he	  is	  seeking	  to	  in-­‐terrupt.	  It	  is	  not	  intended	  to	  describe	  any	  actual	  state,	  liberal	  or	  otherwise.	  But	  nev-­‐ertheless,	   there	   is	   an	   odd	   blindness	   in	   Brettschneider’s	   project	   to	   the	   distinctive	  dystopic	  possibilities	  to	  which	  his	  own	  utopian	  alternative	  might	  give	  rise.	  Bluntly,	   it	   seems	   to	   me	   that	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   two	   dystopias	   that	   drive	  Brettschneider’s	   project	  —the	   Invasive	   State	   and	   the	   Hateful	   Society—he	   might	  have	  added	  a	  third,	  implied	  by	  his	  own	  proffered	  alternative:	  the	  Hypocritical	  State.	  Just	  as	  the	  Invasive	  State	  is	  the	  dystopia	  masked	  by	  the	  egalitarian’s	  political	  aspira-­‐tions,	  and	  the	  Hateful	  Society	  the	  dystopia	   implied	  by	  the	  civil	   libertarian’s,	   so	  the	  Hypocritical	  State,	  I	  suggest,	  is	  the	  dystopia	  which	  Brettschneider’s	  proffered	  alter-­‐native—a	   speechifying	   state,	   committed	   to	   the	   rhetorical	   project	   of	   defending	  equality	  and	   liberty—possibly	  masks,	  and	   legitimates.	   In	  my	  view,	  he	  should	  have	  worried	  about	  that	  possibility,	  at	  least	  a	  little.	  Sometimes,	  when	  actual	  liberal	  states	  speak	  of	  the	  values	  of	  equality,	  diversity,	  and	  liberty,	  they	  are	  doing	  so	  at	  the	  very	  moment	   they	   are	   pursuing	   profoundly	   inegalitarian,	   stultifying,	   and	   oppressive	  ends.	  All	  that	  egalitarian	  persuasion	  might	  be	  toward	  the	  end	  of	  distracting	  people	  from	  the	  inegalitarian	  acts	  it	  is	  undertaking;	  in	  this	  dystopian	  vision	  of	  Brettschnei-­‐der’s	   proffered	   alternative,	   “state	   persuasion”	   is	   more	   or	   less	   a	   form	   of	   lamp-­‐posting.	   It	   is	  designed,	  roughly,	   to	  drive	  the	   listener	  crazy,	  by	   insisting	  the	  state	   is	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doing	   the	   opposite	   of	  what	   it	   is	   doing	   at	   that	   very	  moment.	   (We	   could	   call	   it	   the	  “Lamp-­‐posting	  State.”)	  But	  Brettschneider	  does	  not	  worry	  about	  this	  possibility	  at	  all.	  Rather,	   the	  Persuasive	  State	   in	  Brettschneider’s	   imagination	  utters	  and	  appar-­‐ently	  deeply	  believes	  liberal	  and	  democratic	  values,	  particularly	  the	  value	  of	  equal	  and	  free	  citizenship.	  There	  is	  no	  risk	  of	  hypocrisy	  anywhere	  in	  sight.	  But	  surely	  the	  Hypocritical	  State	  is	  a	  danger	  worth	  attending.	  There	  is	  plenty	  of	  history,	  and	  quite	  a	  bit	  of	  scholarship,	  on	  this.	  Sometimes	  the	  Persuasive	  State’s	  egalitarian	   and	   freedom	  respecting	   rhetoric	   is	   cover	   for	   actions	   that	   are	   viciously	  inegalitarian	   and	   disrespectful—even	   hateful.	  Sometimes,	   to	   use	   the	   critical	   lan-­‐guage	  of	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	   the	  Persuasive	  State	   is	  the	  “legitimating	  state”—its	  equality	  and	  freedom-­‐promoting	  rhetoric	   is	  a	  cover	  for	  deeply	  illiberal	   impulses.60	  We	   need	   look	   no	   further	   in	   our	   own	   contemporary	   society	   than	   the	   very	   high-­‐minded	  liberal,	   liberty-­‐enhancing,	  and	  thoroughly	  moral	   justifications	  that	  various	  state	  actors—Supreme	  Court	  Justices,	  ninth	  grade	  civics	  teachers,	  federal	  and	  state	  prosecutors,	  pro	  bono	  lawyers	  from	  prestigious	  private	  law	  firms,	  judicial	  opinions	  by	   the	   bucket-­‐load,	   and	   academic	   lawyers	   in	   the	   field—proffer,	   when	   discussing	  norms	   of	   our	   criminal	   law	   and	   procedure.	   Juxtapose	   all	   that	   equality	   and	   liberty	  promoting	   rhetoric	   about	   presumptions	   of	   innocence	   and	   the	   dignity-­‐protecting	  rights	   of	   the	  worst	   criminal	   defendants	   and	   how	  we	  would	   rather	   let	   a	   hundred	  guilty	  men	  go	  free	  than	  punish	  a	  single	  innocent—with	  the	  reality	  of	  our	  grotesque-­‐ly	  dysfunctional	   criminal	   justice	   system,	  promulgated	  by	   those	   self-­‐same	  state	  ac-­‐tors,	  that	  incarcerates	  more	  citizens	  per	  capita	  than	  some	  of	  the	  most	  ghastly	  illib-­‐eral	   and	   totalitarian	   dictatorships	   on	   the	   planet,	  and	   does	   so	   for	   the	   flimsiest	   of	  reasons,	  with	  wildly	  disproportionate	  impacts	  on	  black	  and	  brown	  citizens,	  and	  in	  appallingly	   brutal	   conditions	   of	   confinement.	   The	   same	   “state”	   that	   speaks	   of	   the	  dignity,	  equality	  and	  respect	  owed	  to	  criminal	  defendants,	  when	  justifying	  criminal	  law,	  imposes	  penalties	  for	  the	  possession	  of	  crack	  cocaine	  at	  one	  hundred	  times	  the	  harshness	  as	  possession	  of	  powder	  cocaine	  and	  life	  sentences	  for	  trivial	  and	  victim-­‐less,	  as	  well	  as	  unproven	  crimes,	  executes	  prisoners	  in	  the	  face	  of	  proffered	  and	  un-­‐examined	  evidence	  of	  innocence,	  and	  does	  so	  in	  a	  way	  that	  disproportionately	  kills	  African	  American	  citizens,	  and	  targets	  citizens	  abroad	  for	  execution	  on	  hidden	  evi-­‐dence	   presented	   in	   secret	   tribunals	   of	   their	   alleged	   complicity	   with	   terror.	  The	  Hypocritical	  State	  or	  the	  Legitimating	  State	  (or	  the	  Lamp-­‐Posting	  State)	  legitimates	  all	  of	  this	  mayhem	  and	  random	  violence	  it	  inflicts	  with	  high-­‐flying	  language	  justify-­‐ing	   its	   sanctions	   in	   terms	   completely	   congenial	   to	   liberal	   rights;	   indeed,	   often	   in	  terms	  suggesting	  that	  the	  state	  violence	  is	  mandated	  by	  those	  liberal	  values.	  It	  em-­‐
                                                            	   60.	  	   For	  discussions	  of	  the	  legitimating	  role	  of	  legal	  rhetoric,	  and	  particularly	  of	  rights	  rhetoric,	  from	  critical	  literature,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Kimberlé	  W.	  Crenshaw,	  Race,	  Reform,	  and	  Retrenchment:	  Transformation	  and	  
Legitimation	  in	  Antidiscrimination	  Law,	  101	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  1331	  (1988)	  (legitimating	  function	  of	  antidis-­‐crimination	  rights);	  Robert	  W.	  Gordon,	  Unfreezing	  Legal	  Reality:	  Critical	  Approaches	  to	  Law,	  15	  FLA.	  ST.	  U.	  L.	  REV.	  195	  (1987)	  (legitimating	  function	  of	  contract	  rhetoric	  of	  freedom	  and	  equality,	  while	  law	  in	  fact	  serves	   ends	   of	   the	   economically	   dominant);	   Morton	   J.	   Horwitz,	   Rights,	   23	   HARV.	   C.R.-­‐C.L.	   L.	   REV.	   393	  (1988)	  (legitimating	  function	  of	  rights	  to	  serve	  propertied	  interests);	  Tushnet,	  supra	  note	  22	  (legitimat-­‐ing	  function	  of	  First	  Amendment	  rhetoric	  of	  freedom	  of	  speech	  and	  thought,	  while	  law	  serves	  corporate	  ends).	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ploys	  the	  rhetorical	  mechanisms	  of	  persuasion,	  in	  other	  words,	  so	  as	  to	  impose	  co-­‐ercively	  its	  mandates	  in	  ways	  that	  express	  its	  utter	  contempt	  for	  the	  very	  moral	  and	  liberal	  values	  it	  self-­‐righteously,	  loudly,	  and	  repeatedly	  extols.	  The	  extraordinary	  gap	  between	  the	  liberal	  Persuasive	  State	  and	  the	  liberal	  in-­‐carceral	  and	  executing	  state	  may	  be	  the	  largest	  in	  the	  criminal	  justice	  field,	  but	  it	  by	  no	  means	  resides	  solely	  there.	  It	  may,	  in	  fact,	  also	  reside	  in	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  equality	  that	  it	  deploys,	  and	  that	  Brettschneider	  wants	  it	  to	  deploy	  more	  loudly,	  and	   the	  wide	  berth	   it	  gives	   to	   the	  hate	  speech	   it	   tolerates.	   In	  other	  words,	  the	  Persuasive	  State	  of	  Brettschneider’s	  imagining	  might	  just	  be	  protesting	  a	  bit	  too	  loudly.	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  particularly	  those	  of	  us	  attracted	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  Per-­‐suasive	  State,	  and	  its	  potential	  for	  good,	  need	  to	  worry	  about	  this	  legitimating	  func-­‐tion	  of	  the	  Persuasive	  State,	  and	  to	  try	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  counter	  its	  influence.	  The	   second	   substantive	   problem	   regards	   the	   myriad	   purposes	   served	   in	  Brettschneider’s	  book	  by	   the	   line	  drawn	  between	   the	  persuasive	  and	   the	  coercive	  state,	  or	  the	  state	  when	  it	  is	  acting	  in	  its	  “expressive”	  mode,	  and	  when	  it	  is	  acting	  in	  its	   coercive	  mode.	  The	  distinction	   is	  a	  vital	  one	   in	   the	  book;	  not	   just	   theoretically,	  but	  practically.	  It	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  most	  helpful	  doctrinal	  reform	  Brettschnei-­‐der	   advocates:	   that	   First	   Amendment	   law	   and	   particularly	   the	   unconstitutional	  conditions	  doctrine	  be	  redrawn,	  so	  as	  to	  unequivocally	  permit	  the	  state	  to	  refuse	  to	  fund	  groups	   that	   sponsor	   illiberal	   beliefs,	   and	  whether	  or	  not	   those	   groups	  do	   so	  under	  cover	  of	  religious	  dogma,	  through	  withholding	  either	  direct	  grants	  or	  tax	  ex-­‐emptions	   and	  deductions.	  The	  Coercive	   State	   cannot	   and	   should	  not	   censor	   these	  beliefs.	  The	  Persuasive	  State,	  though,	  can	  and	  should	  respond	  to	  the	  content	  of	  the	  ideas	   it	   is	   required	   to	  protect,	  and	  one	  way	   it	   can	  respond	   is	  by	  refusing	   to	  assist	  those	  groups	  in	  the	  marketplace	  of	  ideas.	  This	  important	  suggestion,	  though,	  obvi-­‐ously	  depends	  quite	  heavily	  on	  the	  distinction,	  if	  it	  can	  be	  maintained,	  between	  the	  “Coercive	  State,”	  precluded	  by	  First	  Amendment	  as	  well	  as	   liberal	  principles	   from	  censoring	  hateful	  beliefs,	  and	  the	  “Persuasive	  State,”	  which	  has	  the	  freedom	  and	  re-­‐sponsibility	   to	   counter	   such	   speech	   through	   persuasion.61	   According	   to	  Brettschneider,	   “persuasion”	   includes,	   notably,	   the	   act	   of	  withholding	   tax	   exempt	  status,	  and	  refusals	  to	  extend	  grants.62	  As	  he	  notes,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  for	  the	  most	  part	  disagrees,	  as	  do	  many	  commentators.63	  A	  bit	  more	  development	  of	  the	  mean-­‐ing	   of	   “persuasion,”	   or	   “coercion,”	   or	   both,	  might	   have	   helped	   bridge	   the	   gap	   be-­‐tween	  them.	  More	  generally,	  though,	  the	  distinction	  Brettschneider	  draws	  between	  the	  Co-­‐ercive	  and	  Persuasive	  State,	  is	  a	  little	  too	  black	  and	  white,	  even	  aside	  from	  its	  appli-­‐cation	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  tax	  exemptions	  for	  religious	  or	  other	  groups	  that	  promul-­‐gate	   hate.	  The	   state	   does	   many	   things,	   at	   least	   some	   of	   which	   are	   not	   easily	  categorized	  as	  clear	  examples	  of	  coercion	  or	  clear	  examples	  of	  persuasion.	  Tax	  de-­‐ductions	   and	   exemptions	   are	   just	   one	   such	   close	   case;	   there	   are	   other	   borderline	  cases	   as	  well.	   The	   state	   also	   regulates	   and	   coordinates	   across	   vast	   areas	   of	   social	  
                                                            	   61.	  	   BRETTSCHNEIDER,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  13,	  109.	  	   62.	  	   Id.	  at	  128-­‐40.	  	   63.	  	   Id.	  at	  137-­‐40.	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life,	  all	  of	  which	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  either	  “coercion”	  or	  “persuasion”	  under	  suffi-­‐ciently	  broad	  definitions	  of	  either	  term.	  Let	  me	  just	  give	  one	  example	  of	  what	  might	  be	  an	  ambiguous	  case,	  and	  which	  is	  completely	  undiscussed	  in	  Brettschneider’s	  book,	  but	  which	  is	  of	  direct	  relevance	  to	  his	  general	  thesis,	  and	  that	  is	  the	  state’s	  role	  in	  administering	  tort	  law,	  and	  adju-­‐dicating	  tort	  cases.	  The	  “state”	  administers	  a	  system	  of	  private	  law,	  including	  an	  ar-­‐ray	  of	  tort	  remedies,	  so	  that	  citizens	  can	  pursue,	  through	  actions	  for	  monetary	  dam-­‐ages,	   some	  measure	   of	   corrective	   justice	  when	   they	   have	   been	  wronged,	  without	  turning	   to	   the	  punitive,	   “coercive”	   arm	  of	   the	   state.	  The	   state	   obviously	   facilitates	  these	   private	   actions.	   It	   is	   also	   in	   some	   sense	   responsible	   for	   the	   doctrine	   under	  which	  those	  actions	  proceed.	   It	   is	  not	  clear,	   though,	   in	  Brettschneider’s	   treatment,	  where	   this	   private-­‐rights-­‐and-­‐private-­‐remedies-­‐providing	   function	   falls.	   Does	   the	  state’s	  provision	  of	  tort	  remedies	  for	  private	  wrongs	  constitute	  “persuasion”	  or	  “co-­‐ercion?”	   It	   truly	   is	   not	   clear,	   and	   it	   also	   is	   not	   clear	   where	   Brettschneider	  might	  think	   it	   falls—particularly	   given	   that	   he	   considers	   incentives	   created	   through	   tax	  structures	  or	   the	  withholding	  of	   largesse	   from	   the	  public	  purse	  examples	  of	   “per-­‐suasion.”	  	  It	  is	  a	  question,	  though,	  that	  is	  of	  obvious	  relevance	  to	  the	  issue	  that	  absorbs	  the	  book:	  the	  regulation,	  or	  recognition	  of	  hate	  speech,	  and	  the	  state’s	  response	  to	  it.	   The	   distinction	   between	   the	   criminal	   law—clearly	   coercive—on	   the	   one	   hand,	  and	  regulatory	  or	  tort	  regimes	  on	  the	  other,	  in	  which	  the	  state	  provides	  the	  forum	  and	  spells	  out	  the	  remedy	  but	  private	  parties	  bring	  the	  actions,	  has	  been	  of	  vital	  im-­‐portance	  to	  lawyers	  seeking	  to	  provide	  remedies	  for	  victims	  of	  hate	  speech,	  without	  encroaching	   on	   First	   Amendment	   rights.64	   As	   Brettschneider’s	   overall	   project	   is	  somewhat	  aligned	  with	  theirs,	  at	  least	  in	  its	  goal—he	  too	  wants	  to	  figure	  out	  a	  way	  to	   respond	   to	   the	  anti-­‐equalitarian	  content	  of	  hate	   speech	  without	  offending	  First	  Amendment	   guarantees—he	   might	   have	   looked	   a	   little	   more	   closely	   at	   some	   of	  those	  campaigns.	  So,	  for	  example,	  at	  least	  parts	  of	  the	  failed	  anti-­‐pornography	  ordi-­‐nances	  of	   the	  1980s	  pursued	  by	  Catharine	  MacKinnon	  and	  Andrea	  Dworkin	  were	  specifically	  designed	   so	   as	  not	   to	   employ	   the	  punitive	  arm	  of	   the	   state:	  what	  was	  envisioned	  in	  some	  parts	  of	  those	  ordinances	  were	  civil	  actions	  for	  civil	  remedies,	  contemplating	   the	   imposition	   of	   monetary	   damages	   to	   be	   paid	   to	   the	   victims	   of	  pornography	  by	  purveyors,	  not	  punitive	  actions	  involving	  the	  criminal	  law	  and	  jail	  time.	  Do	  those	  actions,	  and	  the	  state’s	   facilitation	  of	   them,	  constitute	  exemplars	  of	  “coercion”	  or	   “persuasion”?	   It	   seemed,	  at	   least	   to	   the	  backers	  of	   these	  ordinances,	  that	  the	  state’s	  role	   in	  these	  actions	  was	  what	  Brettschneider	  calls	  persuasive,	  not	  coercive.	   I	   suspect	   that	   Brettschneider	  would	   disagree.	  But	   if	   so,	   this	   needs	   a	   de-­‐fense.	  Is	   the	   state’s	   role	   in	   facilitating	   private	   actions	   for	   the	   harms	   done	   by	   hate	  speech	  or	  pornography	   so	   injurious	   to	   the	   rights	   of	   purveyors	   to	   justify	  a	  ban	  on	  even	  such	  civil	  actions?	  This	  goes	  quite	  a	  bit	  further	  than	  what	  seems	  to	  be	  argued	  in	  the	  text,	  which	  is	  that	  criminal	  sanctions	  on	  hate	  speech	  would	  do	  so.	  A	  recognition	  of	  the	  violations	  of	  rights	  arguably	  occasioned	  by	  criminalizing	  
                                                            	   64.	  	   See	  MacKinnon,	  supra	  note	  25;	  Catharine	  A.	  MacKinnon,	  Pornography,	  Civil	  Rights,	  and	  Speech,	  20	  HARV.	  C.R.-­‐C.L.	  L.	  REV.	  1	  (1985).	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various	   forms	  of	  hate	  speech	  by	  no	  means	   implies	  that	  a	  state	  which	  permits	  civil	  actions	  for	  those	  harms,	  followed	  by	  the	  imposition	  of	  monetary	  damages,	  also	  vio-­‐lates	  those	  rights.	  Rather,	  it	  looks	  like	  it	  requires	  only	  that	  the	  speakers	  internalize	  the	  harms	  occasioned	  by	   that	   speech,	  when	   the	   speech	   violates	   the	   civil	   rights	   of	  others,	  with	  civil	  rights	  there	  understood	  in	  its	  original	  and	  ordinary	  way:	  rights	  to	  dignity,	  to	  bodily	  integrity,	  to	  be	  free	  of	  the	  fear	  of	  assault	  in	  society	  and	  cyberspace	  both.	  The	  state	  provides	  the	  forum—the	  courthouse,	  court	  personnel,	  and	  the	  cause	  of	  action—such	   that	   those	  civil	   rights	  can	  be	  vindicated	   in	   the	   form	  of	  private	  ac-­‐tions.	   It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	   the	  state	   is	  performing	  a	  persuasive,	  and	  not	  a	  coercive	  function,	  when	  it	  acts	  as	  such.	  But	  if	  there	  is	  a	  claim	  to	  be	  made	  to	  the	  contrary,	  it	  is	  not	  spelt	  out	  in	  this	  book.	  Another	  way	   to	  put	   this	  concern	   is	   that	   it	   is	  not	  clear	  where	  civil	  actions,	  as	  opposed	   to	   criminal	   sanctions,	   for	   hate	   speech	   and	   pornography	   would	   fall	   on	  Brettschneider’s	  schematic	  divide	  of	   the	  state	   functions	   into	  “coercive”	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  “persuasive”	  on	  the	  other.	  The	  state	  acts	  through	  common	  and	  constitu-­‐tional	   tort	   law	   so	   as	   to	   inhibit	   or	   deter	   a	  wide	   range	   of	   speech	   acts	   involving	   an	  equally	  wide	  range	  of	   types	  of	  harms.	  Thus,	   the	  state	  defines	  as	  “tortious”	  various	  types	   of	   libel,	   slander,	   fraud,	  mail	   fraud,	   blackmail,	   perjury,	   assault,	   stalking,	   har-­‐assment,	  group	  defamation,	  and	  intentional	  infliction	  of	  emotional	  distress,	  among	  god	  knows	  how	  many	  others.	  (Some	  of	  these,	  of	  course,	  are	  also	  crimes.)	  Likewise,	  it	   defines	   as	   actionable	   various	   breaches	   of	   contract,	   copyright,	   and	   patent	   and	  trademark	  rights,	  virtually	  all	  of	  which	  also	   involve	  nothing	  or	  almost	  nothing	  but	  speech	  and	  speech	  acts.	  All	  of	   these	   torts	  and	  contract	  or	  copyright	  violations	  are	  occasioned	  by	  speech	  acts,	  and	  they	  all	  give	  rise	  to	  civil	  sanctions.	  The	  speech	  in	  all	  of	   these	   cases,	   like	   hate	   speech,	   does	   things,	   and	   (arguably)	   by	   so	   doing,	   causes	  harm.	  And	  the	  state’s	  response	  likewise	  does	  something:	  the	  state	  defines	  torts	  and	  court	  rules,	  so	  as	  to	  facilitate	  a	  damage	  award,	  a	  punitive	  damages	  award,	  or	  a	  re-­‐straining	  order,	   in	   response	   to	   the	  harm	  all	   this	   speech	  causes.	  For	   the	  most	  part,	  when	  the	  state	  responds	  in	  such	  a	  way,	  it	  is	  facilitating	  a	  private	  remedy	  designed	  to	  require	  the	  actor	  to	  rectify	  the	  wrongs	  done	  by	  his	  actions,	  and	  to	  internalize	  those	  costs.	  	  The	  same	  would	  be	  true	  of	  a	  (hypothetical)	  civil	  action	  for	  harms	  occasioned	  by	  hate	  speech	  or	  pornography.	  Yet,	  only	  with	  respect	   to	  such	  harmful	  speech	  are	  liberals	   and	   possibly	   Brettschneider	   (although	   it	   is	   not	   entirely	   clear)	   inclined	   to	  close	   the	   courthouse	  door	   and	  preclude	  not	   only	   criminal	   responses	  by	   the	   state,	  but	   also	   civil	   responses	   by	   harmed	   citizens.	  Why?	  Why	   is	   it	   only	   with	   respect	   to	  hate	  speech	  that	  the	  state	  must	  not	  permit	  civil	  recourse?	  Why	  is	  it	  only	  the	  harms	  occasioned	  by	  pornography	  or	  racist	  speech	  that	  inspire	  worries	  that	  any	  state	  al-­‐lowing	  civil	  remedies	  is	  thereby	  acting	  coercively	  rather	  than	  persuasively?	  What	  is	  so	  peculiar	  about	  hate	  speech,	  and	  the	  harms	  it	  occasions,	  out	  of	   the	  vast	  array	  of	  torts	  and	  contract	  actions	  that	  turn	  on	  nothing	  but	  speech—libel,	  defamation,	  har-­‐assment,	   group	   libel,	   slander,	   blackmail,	   fraud,	  mail	   fraud,	   civil	   assault,	   emotional	  infliction	  of	  distress,	  breach	  of	  contract,	   trademark,	  copyright,	  perjury,	  plagiarism,	  and	  so	  on—that	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	   impulse	  to	  shield	  them	  with	  protection	  against	  a	  coercive	  state	  response?	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More	   generally,	   the	   failure	   to	   define	   coercion,	   and	   its	   reach,	   has	   additional	  normative	   consequences	   in	  Brettschneider’s	   argument.	  To	   reverse	  Robert	  Cover’s	  insight	  from	  decades	  ago—that	  all	  state	  speech	  takes	  place	  on	  a	  field	  of	  violence65—all	  coercive	  state	  actions,	  from	  executions	  to	  the	  impositions	  of	  regulatory	  fines,	  civ-­‐il	  sanctions,	  and	  parking	  tickets	  or	  taxes,	  also	  take	  place	  within	  a	  field	  of	  persuasive	  words.	  There	  is	  often	  coercion	  behind	  state	  attempts	  to	  be	  persuasive—think	  of	  the	  interactions	   between	   the	   pregnant	   woman	   seeking	   an	   abortion	   and	   the	   abortion	  provider	   required	   to	  educate	   the	  woman	  with	   respect	   to	  various	  attributes	  of	   the	  fetal	  life	  inside	  her—but	  there	  is	  also	  often,	  perhaps	  very	  often,	  maybe	  even	  always,	  persuasion	  behind	  the	  state’s	  attempts	  to	  coerce.	  The	  efficacy	  of	  persuasive	  action	  requires	   an	   audience,	   and	   the	   state	   sometimes	   attempts	   to	   coerce	   attendance—think	  again	  of	  public	  education.	  Is	  it	  always	  wrong	  to	  require	  attendance?	  If	  not,	  this	  suggests	   a	   continuum	   rather	   than	   a	   bright	   line	   between	   acts	   of	   the	   state	   that	   are	  primarily	   persuasive,	   but	   accompanied	   by	   some	  measure	   of	   coercion,	   even	   if	   just	  coerced	  attendance,	  and	  acts	  of	  coercion	  accompanied	  by	  some	  measure	  of	  persua-­‐sion.	  Sometimes,	   the	  persuasion	   that	   accompanies	  coercive	   state	   action	   is	   just	   ob-­‐noxious	  and	  grating,	  and	  we’d	  be	  better	  off	  without	  it—just	  tell	  me	  what	  it	  will	  cost	  me,	  do	  not	  lecture	  me—when	  you	  are	  imposing	  a	  traffic	  fine.	  Sometimes,	  the	  coer-­‐cion	  that	  might	  accompany	  persuasive	  action,	  however,	  is	  justified—think	  of	  the	  at-­‐tachment	  of	  the	  salary	  that	  accompanies	  the	  imposition	  of	  a	  civil	  or	  regulatory	  fine,	  or	  as	  Brettschneider	  argues	  in	  some	  detail,	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  a	  tax	  exemption	  from	  religious	  views	  that	  are	  hateful.66	  The	  tax	  exemption,	  however,	  is	  not	  an	  anomaly;	  it	  is,	  rather,	  simply	  one	  example	  of	  a	  pervasive	  dynamic:	  Persuasive	  State	  speech	  ac-­‐companied	  by	  some	  measure	  of	  coercion.	  That	  dynamic,	  I	  think,	  requires	  more	  gen-­‐eral	  treatment.	  A	  final	  concern	  goes	  to	  the	  narrowness	  of	  Brettschneider’s	  thesis.	  Why	  are	  we	  focused	  so	  exclusively	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Persuasive	  State	  in	  promoting	  race	  and	  sex	  equality,	   rather	   than	   also	   on	   values	   pertaining	   to	   a	   fair	   or	   just	   distribution	   of	   re-­‐sources?	  Should	  not	  the	  Persuasive	  State	  pursue,	  through	  persuasion,	  these	  liberal	  values	  as	  well?	  The	  paradox	  Brettschneider	  discovers	  of	   the	   state	  protecting	  hate	  speech	   for	   liberal	  reasons,	  even	  though	  the	  speech	   it	  protects	  undermines	   liberal-­‐ism,	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  context	  of	  speech	  and	  speech	  rights.67	  Much	  of	  the	  dynamic	  Brettschneider	  describes—of	  the	  back	  and	  forth	  between	  the	  dystopic	  images	  of	  an	  overly	  Invasive	  State	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  or	  a	  Hateful	  Society	  on	  the	  other—also	  is	  true	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  economic	  liberty	  and	  justice:	  in	  part	  for	  liberal	  sounding	  reasons	  re-­‐garding	   the	   dangers	   of	   concentrated	   state	   power	   and	   the	   values	   of	   individualism	  and	  entrepreneurship,	  we	   tend	   to	   let	  market	   generated	  outcomes	   lie,	   even	  where	  that	  results	  in	  massive	  inequalities	  in	  wealth,	  and	  hence	  concentrations	  of	  economic	  power,	  which	  in	  turn	  can	  squelch	  true	  individualism	  and	  liberty	  in	  the	  private	  sec-­‐tor.68	  Perhaps	  one	  way	  out	  of	  this	  box,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  speech	  context,	  would	  be	  to	  
                                                            	   65.	  	   Robert	  Cover,	  Violence	  and	  the	  Word,	  95	  YALE	  L.J.	  1601	  (1986).	  	   66.	  	   BRETTSCHNEIDER,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  161-­‐63.	  	   67.	  	   Id.	  at	  12.	  	   68.	  	   Id.	  at	  3.	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look	  at	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Persuasive	  State:	  a	  state	  that	  can	  explain	  its	  commitment	  to	  markets	  might	  go	  some	  way	  toward	  undoing	  the	  damage	  unregulated	  markets	  oc-­‐casion,	  or	  on	   the	  other	  side,	  a	  state	   that	  can	  explain	   its	  commitment	   to	  regulating	  them	  might	  also	  bear	  a	  responsibility	  to	  explain	  how	  that	  regulation	  in	  fact	  furthers	  the	   liberties	   that	   it	  seemingly	  constrains.	  A	  shift	   in	   focus	  away	   from	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  the	  state’s	  coercive	  role	  in	  taxing	  and	  redistributing	  wealth	  or	  in	  regulating	  private	  markets,	   and	   toward	   the	  potential	  of	   the	  state’s	  persuasive	   role	   in	   these	  contexts,	  might	  yield	  benefits	  comparable	  to	  the	  shift	  in	  focus	  that	  Brettschneider	  advocates,	  and	  largely	  accomplishes,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  hate	  speech.	  Were	  we	  to	   try	   this,	  however,	  we	  would	   face	  some	  of	   the	  problems	  outlined	  above.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  invasive	  state	  and	  hateful	  society	  dystopias,	  we	  would	  also	  have	   to	  contend	  with	   the	   Inegalitarian	  State,	  and	   the	   Illiberal	  State,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  Hypocritical	   or	   Lamp-­‐Posting	   State.69	  We	  would	  have	   to	   contend	  with	   the	   various	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  state	  acts	  that	  impact	  distributive	  justice	  concerns,	  but	  where	  the	  action	   is	  neither	  cleanly	  coercive	  nor	  cleanly	  persuasive,	  but	  some	  combination	  of	  both.	  Here,	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  “coercive	  vs.	  persuasive”	  understanding	  of	  the	  state	  would	  come	  into	  sharp	  relief:	  the	  main	  way	  that	  the	  state	  affects	  distributive	  justice	  is	  through	  its	  regulatory,	  taxing	  and	  spending	  authority—all	  of	  which	  are	  viewed	  by	  some	  as	  so	  coercive	  as	  to	  be	  theft,	  and	  viewed	  by	  others	  as	  the	  paradigmatic	  exer-­‐cise	  in	  Persuasive	  Statecraft.	  Similarly,	  its	  laws	  of	  inheritance,	  contract,	  and	  proper-­‐ty	  rights,	  all	  of	  which	  aim	  to	  give	   full	  sway	  to	  private	  choice,	  are	  viewed	  by	  some,	  critical	  theorists	  most	  notably,	  but	  more	  generally,	   the	  political	   left,	  as	  so	  coercive	  as	  to	  be	  theft,	  and	  by	  others,	  primarily	  libertarians	  and	  liberals	  but	  some	  communi-­‐tarians	  as	  well,	  as	  the	  heart	  of	  civil	  society.	  In	  all	  of	  these	  areas	  the	  state’s	  acts	  of	  co-­‐ercion	  are	  so	  intertwined	  with	  acts	  of	  persuasion	  that	  it	  will	  be	  hard	  to	  disentangle	  them—suggesting,	   I	  believe,	   the	   limits	  of	   the	  distinction.	   It	  might	  be	  better	   in	   this	  context,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  context	  of	  hate	  speech,	  to	  look	  in	  a	  more	  granular	  way	  at	  the	  specific	  acts	   the	  state	  has	   taken	  without	  categorizing	  them	  as	  coercive	  or	  per-­‐suasive,	  and	  simply	  ask	  whether	  the	  state	  is	  saying	  the	  right	  things,	  when	  it	  speaks,	  as	  the	  wonderful	  title	  of	  Brettschneider’s	  book	  suggests.70	  II.	  LIBERTY,	  EQUALITY,	  AND	  INDIVIDUAL	  RESPONSIBILITIES	  	  Jim	  Fleming	  and	  Linda	  McClain’s	   terrific	  book	   is	  a	  generous	  reinterpretation	  of	   the	  major	   cases	   of	   the	  U.S.	   liberal	   constitutional	   canon,	  with	   the	   aim	  of	   under-­‐scoring	   their	   fit	   with	   a	   reconstituted	   liberalism	   that	   embraces	   some	   measure	   of	  communitarianism	  and	  feminism,	  and	  that	  distinctively	  requires—and	  nurtures—a	  healthy	  dollop	  of	   responsibility	   from	   its	   citizens.71	  Any	  number	  of	   Supreme	  Court	  authored	   constitutional	   cases,	   they	   argue,	   that	   have	   traditionally	   been	   held	   up	   to	  criticism	  for	  the	  ways	  they	  create	  virtue-­‐free	  zones	  of	  insularity	  around	  the	  exercise	  of	  rights,	  do	  not	  in	  fact	  do	  so,	  and	  to	  the	  contrary,	  in	  important	  ways	  bolster	  rather	  than	  destroy	  civic	  virtue.	   	  Rights	   to	  procure	  abortions,	   for	  example,	  particularly	  as	  
                                                            	   69.	  	   Id.	  at	  6.	  	   70.	  	   Id.	  	   71.	  	   FLEMING	  &	  MCCLAIN,	  supra	  note	  2.	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expounded	   in	  Planned	  Parenthood	  v.	  Casey,72	  do	  not	  simply	  grant	   rights	   to	  do	  bad	  things,	   they	   also	   promote	   responsible	   decision	   making	   around	   issues	   of	   life	   and	  family.73	  Parental	  rights	  to	  educate	  one’s	  children	  as	  one	  sees	  fit,	  to	  take	  another	  ex-­‐ample,	  carries	  in	  tow	  the	  responsibility	  for	  attending	  to	  their	  civic	  education,	  and	  all	  toward	  the	  end	  of	  ensuring	  the	  children	  can	  themselves	  mature	  into	  responsible	  cit-­‐izens.74	  Those	  parental	   rights,	   therefore,	  must	   as	   a	   consequence	  be	   shared	  by	   the	  state,	  which	  must	  have	  the	  power	  as	  well	  as	  duty	  to	  provide	  a	  public	  education	  for	  all.75	  Rights	  of	  free	  speech	  and	  worship	  not	  only	  confer	  zones	  of	  impenetrable	  free-­‐dom	  around	  individuals,	  they	  also	  encourage	  individuals’	  responsibility	  for	  author-­‐ing	  their	  own	  conception	  of	  the	  good.76	  Virtually	  all	  such	  liberal	  rights,	  they	  argue,	  including	  the	  right	  to	  marry	  regardless	  of	  sexual	  orientation,	  rights	  to	  worship	  and	  associate	  as	  one	  wishes,	  as	  well	  as	   rights	   to	  be	   free	  of	  discrimination	  or	  abuse	  by	  some	  of	  those	  same	  associative	  private	  actors	  or	  groups,	  should	  all	  be	  understood	  as	  conferring	  not	  only	  a	  right,	  but	  also	  a	  space	  within	  which	  civic	  responsibility	  will	  be	  nurtured	  or	  allowed	  full	   force.77	  Conflicts	  between	  rights	  so	  understood	  should	  be	   resolved	   in	  ways	   that	   honor	   their	   dual	   function	   of	   nurturing	   or	   grounding	   re-­‐sponsibility,	   as	   well	   as	   insulating	   behavior	   in	   virtue-­‐free	   zones	   of	   rights.78	  Rights	  not	  only	  do	  not	  conflict	  with	  the	  responsibility	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  citizenship,	  they	  also	  generally	   either	   presuppose	   it,	   or	   exist	   so	   as	   to	   nurture	   it,	   or	   allow	   it	   to	   flourish,	  among	  other	  ends.	  	  It	   seems	   to	  me	   that	   this	   is	   an	   extremely	   important	   emendation	   of	   constitu-­‐tional	  liberalism.	  First,	  it	  is	  the	  citizen,	  rather	  than	  simply	  the	  “individual”	  that	  is	  at	  the	  center	  of	  Fleming	  and	  McClain’s	  constitutional	  liberalism.79	  That	  alone	  is	  quite	  a	  sea-­‐change:	   liberal	   constitutionalists	   have	   in	   the	   past	   focused	   overwhelmingly	   on	  the	  rights	  of	  individuals,	  rather	  than	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  citizenship.	  Responsibili-­‐ties	   of	   citizenship,	   by	   contrast,	   have	   been	   the	   subject	  matter	   of	   civic	   republicans.	  That	   there	   is	   a	   clear	   distinction	   between	   the	   two,	   though,	   has	   been	   their	   shared	  ground,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  foundation	  of	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  conventional	  wisdom.	  Thus,	  we	  all	  know	  we	  have	  civic	  responsibilities—to	  vote	  and	  to	  serve	  on	  juries,	  most	  nota-­‐bly—and	  we	  know	  we	  have	   individual	  rights—to	  speech,	  worship,	  nondiscrimina-­‐tion,	  and	  privacy.	  But	  we	  have	  tended,	  both	  in	  theory	  and	  likely	  in	  the	  way	  we	  live	  our	   lives,	   to	   think	  of	  our	   individual	  rights	  and	  our	  citizenship	  obligations	  as	  sepa-­‐rate	  and	  often	  in	  tension.	  We	  have	  rights	  to	  be	  left	  alone,	  but	  obligations	  to	  partici-­‐pate.	  We	  have	  rights	  to	  speak	  and	  think	  and	  read,	  and	  to	  align	  ourselves	  with	  abso-­‐lutely	   any	   political	   creed	   we	   wish	   or	   no	   political	   creed	   at	   all;	   we	   have	  responsibilities,	   though,	   to	   participate	   in	   a	   very	   constrained	   and	   even	   choreo-­‐graphed	   public	   dialogue	   over	   the	  meaning	   of	   justice	   and	   its	   implications	   for	   our	  
                                                            	   72.	  	   Planned	  Parenthood	  v.	  Casey,	  505	  U.S.	  833	  (1992).	  	   73.	  	   FLEMING	  &	  MCCLAIN,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  50-­‐80.	  	   74.	  	   Id.	  at	  140.	  	   75.	  	   Id.	  at	  139-­‐45.	  	  	   76.	  	   Id.	  at	  146-­‐47.	  	   77.	  	   Id.	  	  	   78.	  	   Id.	  at	  7.	  	   79.	  	   See	  id.	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public	  institutions,	  when	  it	  comes	  time	  to	  vote.	  We	  have	  rights	  not	  to	  be	  searched,	  or	  interfered	  with	  in	  any	  way	  by	  an	  intrusive	  state,	  but	  we	  have	  obligations	  to	  stand	  up	  and	  be	  counted,	  at	   least	  by	  voting	  and	  serving	  on	   juries	  and	  when	  a	  draft	   is	   in	  force	   by	   registering	   for	  military	   service.	   Our	   rights	   to	   be	   left	   alone,	   basically,	   are	  seemingly	   in	  tension	  with	  our	  obligations	  to	  participate.	   Individual	  rights	  and	  citi-­‐zens’	  obligations,	  or	   responsibilities,	   look	   like	   they	  are	  at	  cross-­‐purposes.	   It	   is	  not	  surprising	  that	  one—individual	  rights—have	  been	  the	  peculiar	  province	  of	  liberal-­‐ism,	  and	  the	  other—citizenship	  obligations—of	  civic	  republicanism,	  one	  of	   liberal-­‐ism’s	  most	  important	  counterweights.	  Entirely	   to	   their	   credit,	   Fleming	   and	  McClain	   are	   attempting	   to	   articulate	   a	  version	   of	   constitutional	   liberalism	   that	   not	   only	   denies	   this	   opposition	   but	   goes	  further:	   the	   strongest	   liberal	   justification	   of	   individual	   rights,	   they	   argue,	   is	   that	  those	   rights	   facilitate	   citizens’	   responsibility	   as	   well	   as	   liberty.80	   The	   reason	   we	  have	  rights	  to	  be	  left	  alone	  is	  not	  to	  push	  us	  toward	  isolation,	  narcissism,	  or	  a	  mor-­‐bid	  individualism,	  but	  rather,	  in	  substantial	  part,	  to	  push	  us	  toward	  a	  more	  respon-­‐sible	  engagement	  with	  civic	  life.81	  Rights	  make	  us	  better	  citizens,	  and	  therefore	  bet-­‐ter	  able	  to	  perform	  our	  duties	  of	  citizenship	  responsibly.	  Individual	  rights	  are	  not,	  then,	   in	   tension	  with	   citizenship:	   they	  are	   facilitative	  of	   it.	  The	  opposition	  of	   civic	  republicanism	  with	  liberal	  individualism,	  and	  the	  opposition	  of	  the	  citizen	  to	  the	  in-­‐dividual,	   is	   simply	  mistaken.	  Liberal	   constitutional	   rights	  serve	   the	   individual	   in	  a	  myriad	  of	  ways,	  but	  one	  such	  way,	  is	  by	  enhancing	  his	  capacity	  for	  responsible	  citi-­‐zenship.	  	  I	  would	   like	   to	  offer	  an	  amendment,	   rather	   than	  critique,	  of	   the	  overall	  pro-­‐ject.	  Fleming	  and	  McClain	  do	  not	  say	  as	  much	  as	  perhaps	  they	  could	  about	  the	  actual	  content	  of	  citizens’	  responsibilities.	  The	  adult	  who	  can	  shoulder	  the	  responsibilities	  of	   citizenship	   turns	   out	   to	   be	   the	   raison	   d’être	   of	   a	   goodly	   number	   of	   rights.	   But	  what	   exactly	   is	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   responsibility	   that	   citizens	   bear,	   qua	   citizen?	  Of	  what	  does	   it	   consist?	  What	   is	   the	   responsible	   citizen	   responsible	   for?	  They	  give	  a	  brief	  account	  early	  on:	  	   [W]e	   aspire	   to	   secure	   the	   preconditions	   for	   democratic	   and	   per-­‐sonal	   self-­‐government:	   first,	   the	   basic	   liberties	   that	   are	   precondi-­‐tions	   for	   deliberative	   democracy	   to	   enable	   citizens	   to	   apply	   their	  capacity	  for	  a	  conception	  of	  justice	  to	  deliberating	  about	  and	  judg-­‐ing	  the	  justice	  of	  basic	  institutions	  and	  social	  policies	  as	  well	  as	  the	  common	   good,	   and	   second,	   the	   basic	   liberties	   that	   are	   precondi-­‐tions	   for	   deliberative	   autonomy	   to	   enable	   citizens	   to	   apply	   their	  capacity	  for	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  to	  deliberating	  about	  and	  de-­‐ciding	  how	  to	  live	  their	  own	  lives.82	  	  	  The	  responsibility,	  then,	  that	  rights	  promote	  and	  that	  citizens	  must	  possess	  to	  live	  good	  lives	  is	  the	  responsibility	  for	  deliberation	  over	  conceptions	  of	  justice	  and	  
                                                            	   80.	  	   Id.	  at	  146-­‐47.	  	  	   81.	  	   Id.	  at	  77.	  	  	   82.	  	   Id.	  at	  3-­‐4	  (emphasis	  omitted).	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the	  common	  good,	  as	  well	  as	  over	  the	  justice	  of	  institutions	  and	  social	  policies,	  so	  as	  to	  be	  a	  more	  responsible	  participant	  in	  democracy,	  and	  responsibility	  to	  deliberate	  over	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  individual	  good,	  so	  as	  to	  responsibly	  decide	  how	  to	  live	  our	  own	  lives.83	  This	  is,	  as	  the	  authors	  say	  several	  times,	  “responsibility	  as	  autonomy”:	  the	   responsible	   citizen	   is	   the	   citizen	   who	   is	   responsible	   for	   him	   or	   herself,	   the	  course	  of	  her	  life,	  and	  her	  public-­‐regarding	  decisions.84	  	  In	  my	  view,	   this	   sets	   a	   peculiarly	   low	  bar:	   the	   responsibilities	   of	   citizenship	  that	  are	  seemingly	  protected	  or	  implied	  by	  the	  individual	  rights	  they	  canvas	  are	  not	  particularly	  demanding.	  The	  responsible	  citizen	  must	  formulate	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  life,	  so	  that	  he	  might	  better	  lead	  one,	  and	  then	  a	  theory	  of	  justice	  and	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  “common	  good,”	  so	  that	  he	  might	  sensibly	  vote.	  That	  is	  basically	  it.	  He	  is	  not	  responsible	  for	  actually	  promoting	  the	  common	  good,	  or	  any	  part	  of	  it,	  or	  justice,	  or	  just	  institutions;	  rather,	  he	  is	  responsible	  for	  formulating	  some	  conception	  of	  all	  of	  that	  so	  as	  to	  better	  participate	  in	  voting	  and	  public	  debate.	  Constitutional	  liberalism	  itself	  imposes	  no	  such	  obligations.	  He	  need	  not	  develop	  a	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  for	  the	  well	  being	  of	  his	   fellow	  citizens,	  beyond	  what	  might	  be	   required	  by	  whatever	  conception	  of	  justice	  he	  embraces.	  He	  need	  not	  shoulder	  any	  obligation	  or	  feel	  any	  responsibility	  for	  the	  shared	  fate	  of	  his	  community	  or	  neighborhood.	  He	  need	  bear	  no	  responsibility	  for	  subsequent	  generations	  or	  for	  the	  fates	  of	  far-­‐flung	  peoples.	  He	  needs	  to	  be	  able	  to	  articulate	  some	  conception	  of	  justice,	  but	  not	  any	  particular	  con-­‐ception	  that	  will	  render	  him	  minimally	  responsible	  for	  anyone’s	  well-­‐being	  but	  his	  own.	   The	   responsibility	   he	  will	   develop,	   and	   the	   responsibility	   that	   liberal	   rights	  will	  nurture,	   is	  his	  sense	  of	  ownership	  of	  his	  own	  conception	  of	  the	  good,	  of	  some	  view	  of	  justice	  that	  can	  dictate	  his	  public	  choices,	  and	  of	  responsibility	  for	  his	  own	  life	  and	  well	  being.	  This	  is	  an	  example,	  and	  an	  implication	  of	  the	  “responsibility	  as	  autonomy”	  version	  of	   responsibility	   that	  Fleming	  and	  McClain	  attribute	   to	   liberal-­‐ism,	  and	  which	  they	  embrace.85	   It	  does	  not	  go	  beyond	  that.	  The	   liberal	  citizen	  has	  responsibilities	  as	  well	  as	  rights,	  but	  those	  responsibilities	  do	  not	  include	  responsi-­‐bility	  for	  the	  collective	  decisions	  of	  his	  state,	  nation,	  or	  community.	  He	  need	  develop	  no	   sense	  of	   responsibility	   for	   the	   impact	  of	  his	   life	  or	  decisions	  on	  his	   fellow	  citi-­‐zens.	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  this	  sets	  a	   low	  bar;	   it	   is	  only	  barely	  higher	  than	  the	  rock	  bottom	  responsibility	  of	  the	  individual	  rights-­‐bearer,	  as	  described,	  and	  decried,	  by	  liberalism’s	  critics.86	  I	  think	  it	  is	  too	  low,	  even	  by,	  particularly	  by,	  liberalism’s	  own	  lights.	   I	  would	   think	  that	   in	  a	   liberal	  society,	  and	  particularly	   in	  a	   liberal	  constitu-­‐tional	  society,	  citizens	  distinctively	  share	  in	  the	  project	  of	  sovereignty.	  The	  essence	  of	  constitutionalism,	  as	  we	  are	  so	  often	  reminded,	  is	  that	  “We	  the	  People”	  constitute	  the	  state:	  we	  authored	  its	  Constitution,	  we	  own	  its	  institutions	  of	  governance,	  and	  if	  so,	   then	  we	   are	   therefore	   in	   some	  measure	   responsible	   for	   both	   its	  machinations	  and	  its	  outcomes,	  at	  least	  in	  our	  capacities	  as	  citizens,	  rather	  than	  stand	  in	  a	  down-­‐
                                                            	   83.	  	   Id.	  at	  114-­‐15.	  	  	   84.	  	   Id.	  at	  63-­‐65,	  111-­‐15.	  	   85.	  	   Id.	  at	  40-­‐79.	  	   86.	  	   Id.	  at	  1.	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ward	   hierarchic	   relation	   to	   it.87	  What	   does	   that,	   in	   turn,	   imply,	   regarding	   our	   re-­‐sponsibilities?	  Well—We	  the	  People	  created	  the	  Constitution	  which	  in	  turn	  creates	  a	   government,	   and	   at	   least	   pursuant	   to	   that	   Constitution’s	   Preamble,	   the	   govern-­‐ment	  exists	  to	  promote	  the	  “general	  welfare.”88	  Does	  not	  the	  citizen,	  then,	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  do	  likewise?	  And	  if	  that	  is	  fair,	  then	  the	  citizen	  should	  share	  in	  the	  re-­‐sponsibilities	  not	  only	  of	  voters	  called	  on	  to	  exercise	  judgment,	  and	  of	  individuals	  to	  decide	   for	   themselves	   how	   to	   live,	   but	   for	   the	   full	   array	   of	   the	   responsibility	   of	   a	  sovereign	  to	  enhance	  the	  community’s	  general	  well-­‐being,	  albeit,	  for	  each	  such	  citi-­‐zen,	  only	   in	  small	  measure.	   If	   citizens	   in	   liberal	  democracies	  share	   in	  sovereignty,	  and	  hence	  in	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  sovereign,	  then	  perhaps	  it	  should	  be	  part	  of	  the	  work	  of	   constitutional	   liberalism	   to	   spell	   out	   in	   greater	  detail	   than	   is	   done	   in	  this	  book	  what	  that	  relationship	  might	  be,	  and	  what	  those	  obligations	  entail.	  Let	  me	  make	  some	  suggestions	   to	  make	  a	   little	   clearer	  what	   I	  have	   in	  mind.	  What	  are	  the	  state’s	  responsibilities,	  in	  a	  liberal	  constitutional	  state,	  and	  what	  does	  it	   suggest	   of	   citizens’	   responsibilities,	   if	   citizens	   share	   in	   them?	   Perhaps,	   if	  Brettschneider	   is	   right,	   the	   state	  has	   the	   responsibility	   to	   respond	   to	  hate	   speech	  with	  persuasion,	  and	  if	  so,	  perhaps	  citizens	  have	  responsibilities	  to	  do	  so	  as	  well.89	  But	  surely	  there	  are	  other	  responsibilities.	  A	  good	  “sovereign”	   in	  any	  form	  of	  gov-­‐ernment,	  but	  certainly	  including	  a	  liberal	  one,	  has	  a	  duty	  to	  care	  for	  his	  or	  its	  sub-­‐jects	   in	  various	  welfare-­‐enhancing	  ways—to	  protect	  them	  against	  violence,	   for	  ex-­‐ample,	   both	   internal	   and	   external,	   as	   suggested	   by	   our	   own	   Constitution’s	   Equal	  Protection	   Clause	   and	   the	   various	   Civil	   Rights	   Acts	   that	   clause	   was	   intended	   to	  ground,	  but	  also,	  and	  more	  generally,	  to	  promote	  their	  well-­‐being.	  A	  citizen,	  then,	  in	  a	   liberal	  state	   in	  which	  the	  sovereign	  and	  the	  people	  are	  one	  and	  the	  same,	  might	  also	  share	  in	  the	  duty	  to	  care,	  even	  if	  only	  on	  occasion	  and	  in	  small	  measure,	  for	  his	  or	  her	  co-­‐citizens.	  Each	  citizen	  in	  a	  liberal	  state,	  in	  other	  words,	  might	  have	  a	  fiduci-­‐ary—like	  sovereign	  relation	  to	  every	  other.	  This	  element—a	  responsibility	   to	  care	  for	  co-­‐citizens—seems	  to	  me	  to	  be	  missing	  from	  Fleming	  and	  McClain’s	  account,	  but	  I	  think	  it	  would	  fit	  within	  it	  quite	  naturally.	  A	  citizen	  in	  a	  constitutionally	  liberal	  state,	  in	  which	  we	  the	  people	  constituted	  the	  state	  itself	  in	  order	  to	  enhance	  public	  well-­‐being,	  has	  a	  responsibility	  not	  only	  to	  vote	  and	  deliberate,	  but	  also	   to	   support	  public	   institutions	   that	   in	   turn	  protect	  all	  citizens,	  including,	  notably,	  the	  police	  force	  and	  the	  military.90	  Such	  a	  citizen	  might	  then	  have	  a	  responsibility,	   stemming	   from	  citizenship,	   to	   turn	   to	   the	  community’s	  police	  for	  protection	  against	  assault,	  and	  forego	  “self-­‐help”	  and	  one’s	  own	  weapon-­‐ry,	   just	   as	   the	   individual	  may	   have	   a	   right	   to	   the	   protection	   against	   violence	   the	  state	   is	   obligated	   to	   provide.	   Likewise,	   a	   citizen	   in	   a	   liberal	   constitutional	   state	  might	  have	  a	  responsibility	  to	  participate	  in	  some	  way	  in	  the	  defense	  of	  one’s	  coun-­‐try.	  A	  citizen	  in	  such	  a	  state	  may	  have	  a	  positive	  moral	  and	  political	  (as	  well	  as	  legal)	  duty	  to	  pay	  his	  or	  her	  fair	  share	  of	  taxes:	  that	  citizen-­‐sovereign	  has	  a	  duty	  to	  pro-­‐
                                                            	   87.	  	   Id.	  at	  9-­‐10.	  	   88.	  	   Id.	  	   89.	  	   BRETTSCHNEIDER,	  supra	  note	  1.	  	   90.	  	   FLEMING	  &	  MCCLAIN,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  114-­‐15.	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vide	  the	  goods	  necessary	  for	  the	  general	  common	  good,	  the	  cost	  of	  which	  is	  covered	  by	   the	  public	  purse.	  A	   citizen	   in	   a	   liberal	   state	  might	   also	  have	  a	   responsibility	   to	  support	  public	  education—to	  help	  defray	  the	  costs	  of	  educating	  all	  of	  our	  children,	  because	  their	  future	  is	  part	  of	  our	  responsibility—as	  well	  as	  to	  support	  other	  fora	  of	  public	   participation,	   such	   as	   libraries	   and	  museums,	   no	   less	   than	   public	   hearings	  and	  trials.	  Those	  public	  and	  participatory	  institutions	  promote	  the	  general	  welfare,	  which	  each	  of	  us	  is	  responsible	  for	  nurturing.	  It	  might	  not	  be	  solely	  a	  matter	  of	  de-­‐liberating	   jointly	   regarding	   the	  content	  of	   justice	  or	   the	  common	  good.	  It	   is	   also	  a	  matter	  of	  caring	  for	  each	  other	  in	  our	  citizen-­‐sovereign	  capacity,	  and	  then	  providing	  support,	  through	  taxes,	  volunteer	  labor,	  or	  both,	  of	  those	  institutions	  and	  goods	  and	  provisions	  that	  increase	  the	  general	  well-­‐being	  of	  our	  neighbors.	  Fleming	  and	  McClain	  recognize,	  and	  argue	  for,	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  “state”	  to	  do	  much	  of	  this.	  The	  Constitution	  they	  defend	  distinctively	  consists	  of	  positive	  as	  well	  as	  negative	  rights:	  citizens	  have	  positive	  rights	  to	  various	  state	  provided	  goods,	  such	  as	  education	  and	  defense	  of	  the	  public	  against	  outside	  threats,	  and	  therefore,	  of	   positive	   duties,	   as	   well	   as	   rights,	   incumbent	   upon	   the	   state	   to	   provide	   those	  goods.91	  And,	  their	  book	  is	  overwhelmingly	  devoted	  to	  the	  thesis	  that	  individual	  cit-­‐izens	   in	   liberally	   constitutional	   states	   have	   responsibilities	   that	   follow	   from	   their	  various	  rights.92	  What	  they	  do	  not	  do,	  though,	  is	  draw	  the	  inference	  that	  the	  citizen	  therefore	  shares	  in	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  state	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  various	  goods,	  to	  which	   individuals	  have	  positive	  rights.	  These	  are	  what	   I	  would	  call	   the	  positive	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  sovereign	  citizen.	  And	  why	  do	  they	  not?	  One	  reason	  might	  be	  simply	  that	  the	  citizen,	  in	  Fleming	  and	  McClain’s	  argument,	  like	  the	  “individual”	  in	  more	  typical	  treatments	  of	  constitu-­‐tional	  liberalism,	  is	  always	  opposed	  to,	  or	  contrasted	  with,	  or	  in	  some	  other	  relation	  to,	  “the	  state,”	  or	  “the	  government,”	  or	  sometimes	  to	  “the	  community.”	  The	  citizen,	  in	   Fleming	   and	   McClain’s	   treatment,	   has	   rights,	   both	   negative	   rights	   against	   the	  state	  and	  some	  positive	  rights	  to	  something	  from	  the	  state,	  and	  has	  responsibilities	  for	  formulating	  a	  theory	  of	  justice	  with	  which	  to	  deliberate	  about	  the	  justice	  of	  pub-­‐lic	   institutions	   so	   as	   to	   inform	   his	   voting,	   and	   the	   responsibility	   to	   formulate	   his	  own	  conception	  of	   the	  good	   life.93	  The	   state,	   in	   turn,	  has	   responsibilities	   to	   foster	  those	  capacities	  in	  the	  citizen	  and	  has	  duties	  to	  provide	  goods	  to	  which	  the	  citizen	  has	  positive	  rights.94	  But	  the	  state	  and	  the	  citizen	  remain	  entirely	  separate	  entities.	  The	   state	   creates	   the	   conditions	   for	   liberalism,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   institutions	   that	   en-­‐sure	  and	  constitute	  it.	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  this	  is	  a	  misstep.	  An	  explicit	  recognition	  of	  the	  citizen’s	  sover-­‐eignty,	  and	  the	  responsibilities	  such	  a	  citizen	  has	  by	  virtue	  of	  his	  or	  her	  sovereignty,	  might	   sharpen	   the	   conflict	   between	   Fleming	   and	  McClain’s	   soft	   perfectionism,	   or	  more	  generally,	  their	  communitarianism,	  and	  theories	  of	  liberalism	  that	  are	  indeed	  more	  insulating	  of	  individual	  freedom	  and	  action	  than	  theirs.	  Liberal	  individualism	  
                                                            	   91.	  	   Id.	  	  	   92.	  	   Id.	  	   93.	  	   Id.	  at	  6-­‐7.	  	   94.	  	   Id.	  at	  7.	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does	  not	  have	  a	  way	  to	  speak	  of	  the	  sovereign	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  citizen.	  As	  a	  re-­‐sult,	  even	  if	  rights	  in	  a	  liberal	  individualist	  state	  do	  provide	  space	  for	  the	  develop-­‐ment	   of	   various	  modes	   of	   individual	   responsibility,	   sovereign	   responsibility—the	  responsibility	  to	  care	  in	  a	  sovereign	  way	  for	  one’s	  co-­‐citizens—is	  not	  included;	  ra-­‐ther,	  the	  individual	  has	  a	  responsibility,	  at	  most,	  to	  prepare	  for	  his	  or	  her	  occasional	  role	  as	  voter,	  but	   the	   individual	   is	  nevertheless	  apart	   from	  and	  different	   from	  the	  government	  that	  recognizes	  the	  individual’s	  rights.	  In	  a	  truly	  liberal	  state,	  however,	  or	   at	   least	   in	   a	   truly	   liberal	   state	   that	   has	   embraced	   Fleming	   and	   McClain’s	   soft	  communitarianism	  and	  feminism,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  liberal	  regard	  for	  individual	  liber-­‐ty,	   the	  citizen	  is	  constitutive	  of	  the	  state	  and	  of	  the	  government,	  not	  apart	   from	  it.	  She	  or	  he	  is	  responsible,	  then,	  in	  small	  measure,	  and	  only	  on	  occasion,	  but	  neverthe-­‐less	   shoulders	   some	   responsibility,	   for	   the	   well-­‐being,	   the	   equal	   education,	   the	  equal	  opportunity,	  and	  the	  safety	  and	  security	  as	  well	  as	  the	  conditions	  of	  liberty,	  of	  all.	  	   CONCLUSION	  These	  books	  are	  both	  defenses	  of	  liberal	  rights,	  but	  they	  are	  defenses	  of	  a	  very	  particular	  sort:	  they	  both	  embrace,	  rather	  than	  resist,	  the	  moral	  claims	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  rights’	  critics’	  case	  against	  the	  various	  rights	  being	  defended.	  Brettschneider	  agrees	  with	  First	  Amendment	  critics	  that	  the	  content	  of	  hate	  speech	  is	  of	  relevance	  to	  public	   justifications	  of	  democracy,	  and	  that	  accordingly	   the	  state	  cannot	  simply	  ignore	   it.95	   Fleming	   and	  McClain	   agree	  with	   Glendon	   that	   the	   virtues	  matter,	   and	  with	  a	   range	  of	   critics,	   including	  Sandel	   and	  Sunstein	  and	  others,	   that	  democratic	  participation	  of	  citizens	  matters	  as	  well.96	  Both	  books	  then	  go	  on	  to	  resist	  the	  crit-­‐ics’	  conclusions:	  that	  abortion	  should	  therefore	  be	  criminalized,	  at	  least	  more	  than	  it	  is	  now,	  so	  as	  to	  further	  virtue,	  or	  that	  protection	  of	  individual	  rights	  should	  be	  cut	  back	  so	  as	  to	  ensure	  greater	  democratic	  participation,	  or	  that	  the	  First	  Amendment	  should	  be	  trimmed	  down	  in	  size	  to	  permit	  greater	  censorship	  of	  the	  speech	  that	  un-­‐dercuts	  liberal	  values.	  Both	  do	  so,	  largely,	  by	  embracing	  a	  larger	  role	  for	  responsi-­‐bility	   than	  that	   typically	  advanced	  by	  more	  traditional	  defenders	  of	   liberal	  values:	  the	   responsibility	   of	   the	   liberal	   state	   to	   counter	   noxious	   hate	   speech,	   and	   the	   re-­‐sponsibility	   entailed	  by	   rights	   of	   each	   citizen	   to	   formulate	   a	   vision	  of	   the	   good	   to	  guide	  his	  own	   life,	  and	  a	  conception	  of	   justice	  and	  of	   the	  common	  good	   to	   inform	  her	  decisions	  at	  the	  voting	  box.	  Let	  me	  just	  note	  by	  conclusion	  that	  both	  could	  have	  gone	  further.	  Brettschnei-­‐der	  could	  have	  asked	  whether	  the	  responsibility	  of	  states	  to	  respond	  to	  hate	  speech	  persuasively	  might	   include	  the	  responsibility	  to	  open	  the	  courthouse	  doors	  to	  pri-­‐vate	   actions	   for	   compensation	   for	   the	   harms	   this	   wrongful	   conduct	   causes.	   This	  would	   enhance,	   presumably,	   the	   responsibility	   of	   citizens	   who	   engage	   in	   such	  speech	  for	  the	  harms	  they	  cause,	  and	  the	  responsibility	  of	  victims	  for	  ownership	  of	  the	  means	  of	   seeking	  recompense,	  well	   shy	  of	  petitioning	   the	  state	   to	  behave	   in	  a	  censorial	  way	   on	   their	   behalf.	   Tort	   law	   enhances	   responsibility	   in	   all	   three	  ways:	  
                                                            	   95.	  	   BRETTSCHNEIDER,	  supra	  note	  1.	  	   96.	  	   See	  GLENDON,	  supra	  note	  5;	  SANDEL,	  supra	  note	  6;	  SUNSTEIN,	  supra	  note	  7.	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the	   responsibility	   of	   the	   tortfeasor	   is	   enhanced	   if	   he	   or	   she	   is	   liable	   for	   harms	  caused,	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  victim	  is	  enhanced	  if	  he	  or	  she	  is	  given	  authorship	  of	  the	  private	  action	  that	  can	  generate	  a	  remedy,	  and	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  state	  is	  enhanced,	  if	  it	  persuasively	  authorizes	  the	  use	  of	  the	  courts,	  and	  the	  common	  law,	  toward	   these	  ends.	   It	   strikes	  me	  as	  a	  possibility	   that	  deserved	  at	   least	   a	  mention.	  The	   responsibility	   deficit	   in	   this	   field	   extends	   not	   only	   to	   state	   actors	  who	   fail	   to	  seize	  the	  opportunity	  to	  put	  forth	  egalitarian	  rhetoric. It	  also	  extends	  to	  private	  ac-­‐tors,	  individuals	  and	  corporations	  both,	  who	  are	  shielded	  from	  reckoning,	  and	  com-­‐pensating,	  for	  the	  harms	  done	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  speech	  acts	  they	  pursue.	  	  Fleming	   and	   McClain’s	   extremely	   promising	   and	   even	   inspirational	   reinter-­‐pretation	   of	   the	   liberal	   constitutional	   canon	   also,	   I	   think,	   suggests	   untaken	   paths	  that	  might	  deepen,	  and	  broaden	  the	  project.	  The	  rights	  they	  interpret,	  and	  defend,	  open	   the	  door	   for	   individual	  authorship	  of	   conceptions	  of	   the	  good	  and	  of	   justice,	  and	   all	   toward	   the	   end	   not	   only	   of	   permitting	   individuals	   to	   steer	   clear	   of	   all	   in-­‐volvement	  with	  the	  state,	  but	  rather,	  of	  enhancing	  the	   individual’s	  performance	  of	  duties	  of	  citizenship.	  Perhaps	  the	  additional	  content	  I	  suggest	  is	  missing	  from	  their	  books	  is	  a	  project	  for	  another	  day,	  or,	  as	  they	  suggest	  in	  a	  response	  to	  a	  version	  of	  this	  critique	  that	  I	  presented	  on-­‐line,	  a	  project	  best	  understood	  as	  sounding	  in	  “po-­‐litical	   theory”	   rather	   than	   “constitutional	   theory.”	   I’m	   not	   sure,	   though,	   that	   the	  fields	  should	  be	  so	  separated,	  or	  that	  they	  could	  be.	  What	  are	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  citizen,	  in	  a	  liberal	  state,	  qua	  citizen?	  Surely	  they	  are	  different	  than	  they	  would	  be	  in	  a	  state	  that	  does	  not	  so	  distinctively	  share	  sovereignty,	  as	  well	  as	  rights,	  with	  its	  citizens.	  A	  citizen	  who	  partakes	  of	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  sovereignty,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rights	  of	  individualism,	  presumably	  faces	  enhanced	  duties.	  What	  are	  they?	  Are	  they	  a	  part	  of	  the	  constitutional	  scheme?	  If	  the	  constitution	  articulates	  and	  protects	  rights,	  and	  the	  point	  of	   those	  rights	   is	   in	  part	  to	  enhance	  democratic	  participation	  rather	   than	  guarantee	  our	  rights	   to	  steer	  clear	  of	   it,	   then	  should	  not	  our	  constitu-­‐tional	   theory,	  as	  well	  as	  our	  Constitution,	  at	   least	  point	  the	  way	  toward	  an	  under-­‐standing	  of	  what	  those	  duties	  might	  consist?	  In	  other	  words,	  I	  sense	  a	  missed	  opportunity.	  We	  are	  facing,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  first	  two	  decades	  of	   this	  century	  but	  with	  no	  clear	  end	   in	  sight,	  a	  deficit	  on	   the	  side	  of	  sovereign	  and	  citizen	  responsibilities	   that	   truly	  staggers	   the	   imagination:	  we	  elect	  legislators	  that	  cannot	  or	  will	  not	  legislate,	  we	  engage	  in	  rites	  of	  citizenship,	  such	  as	  voting,	  with	  no	  regard	  for	  the	  public	  or	  common	  good,	  rather	  than	  individual	  gain,	  we	  overly	  privatize	  our	  children’s	  schooling,	   increasingly	  our	  police	   forces,	  and	  of	  course	  most	  notoriously	  our	  public	  health,	  to	  the	  point	  of	  starving	  the	  public	  insti-­‐tutions	   charged	   with	   providing	   those	   goods.	   Furthermore,	   we	   now	   grant	   quasi-­‐individual	  rights	  of	  speech	  and	  participation	  to	  extremely	  powerful	  corporate	  and	  associational	  entities	  who	  have	  absolutely	  no	  correlate	  sovereign	  responsibility	   to	  promote	  the	  common	  good	  or	  the	  justice	  of	  governmental	  institutions.	  This	  too	  con-­‐tributes	  to	  the	  responsibility	  deficit.	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  all	  of	  this	  we	  have	  under-­‐funded	  schools,	  under-­‐policed	  neighborhoods	  even	  while	  the	  prisons	  are	  overpopu-­‐lated	   and	   citizens	   are	   over-­‐stopped	   and	   frisked,	   little	   to	   no	   decent	   public	   health	  care,	   a	   surfeit	   of	   irresponsible	   corporate	   action	   and	   a	   system	   of	   private	   law	   that	  cannot	   seem	   to	   rise	   to	   the	  occasion	   to	   reverse	   that	   trend,	   an	  under-­‐cared	   for	  dis-­‐
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eased	   planet,	   and	   an	   executive	   branch	   that	   conducts	   wars	   that	   are	   insufficiently	  scrutinized	  by	   journalists	  as	  well	  as	  watchdog	  congressional	  committees.	   If	   that	   is	  right,	  and	  I	  suspect	  that	  Fleming	  and	  McClain	  agree	  that	  it	  is,	  and	  if	  the	  Constitution,	  under	  their	  interpretation,	  requires	  of	  individuals	  and	  citizens	  some	  measure	  of	  re-­‐sponsibility	  for	  the	  good	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  our	  justice,	  then	  surely	  we	  have	  a	  prob-­‐lem	   of	   constitutional,	   and	   not	   just	   political	   dimension.	   Citizens,	   as	   sovereigns,	   as	  well	  as	  all	  of	  those	  corporations,	  associations,	  unions,	  and	  employers	  who	  increas-­‐ingly	  reap	  the	  benefits	  of	  their	  status	  as	  newly	  discovered	  “individuals,”	  are	  shirking	  those	  public	  responsibilities.	  The	  results,	  as	  Mary	  Ann	  Glendon,	  Michael	  Sandel,	  and	  other	  communitarians	  and	  civic	  republicans	  warned	  might	  happen	  some	  time	  ago,	  are	  indeed,	  in	  part,	  an	  impoverished	  public	  sphere,	  an	  undereducated	  population,	  a	  frayed	  social	  net,	  and	  a	  dangerously	  polluted	  planet.97	  The	  result	  is	  also,	  if	  Fleming	  and	  McClain	  are	   right	  about	   the	  core	  meaning	  of	   the	  United	  States	  Constitution,	  a	  compromised	  and	  denuded	  constitutional	  life.	  We	  have	  neglected	  our	  own	  constitu-­‐tional	  tradition,	  no	  less	  than	  our	  cherished	  public	  and	  private	  rights,	  as	  we	  neglect	  the	  very	  public	  and	  other-­‐regarding	  responsibilities	  of	  citizenship.	  	  
                                                            	   97.	  	   See	  GLENDON,	  supra	  note	  5;	  SANDEL,	  supra	  note	  6.	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